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[Al doubts . . . respecting the meaning of a treaty ... are to be heard and
decided in the Courts of Justice having cognizance of the causes in which they
arise, and whose duty it is to determine them according to the rules and
maxims established by the laws of nations for the interpretation of treaties.
John Jay, Draft Letter to the States to Accompany the Resolutions
Passed by the Continental Congress on March 21, 1787. Agreed to
Unanimously, April 13, 1787.1
Gov. Randolph observed the difficulty in establishing the powers of the
judiciary--the object however at present is to establish this principle, to wit,
the security of foreigners where treaties are in their favor . . . . Agreed to
unanimously.
Edmund Randolph, Records of the Federal Convention, June
13, 1787.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In Medellin v. Texas, a high profile case of the U.S. Supreme Court's
2008 Term, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer engaged in a sharp
exchange over the proper approach to treaty interpretation. Medellin raised the
question of whether decisions by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are
"non-self-executing"-that is, whether they only become federal law if
Congress passes a statute "executing" them. 4
The Court was divided. Six Justices held that judgments by the ICJ do in
fact require further action by Congress before they become law. Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for the Court, argued that when it comes to treaties, the text
governs, 5 and the text and structure of the ICJ treaty anticipated future
legislative action because it required only that parties to the ICJ proceeding
"undertake[] to comply" with the ICJ's decision. Justice Stevens, concurring
in the judgment, agreed: "in my view, the words 'undertakes to comply'-
while not the model of either a self-executing or a non-self-executing
commitment-are most naturally read as a promise to take additional steps to
enforce ICJ judgments."7 In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the majority
1. 4 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS: FROM THE FIRST
MEETING THEREOF TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONFEDERATION, BY THE ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 329, 331-32 (Thomas B. Wait ed., Boston 1821) [hereinafter 4
SECRET JOURNALS OF CONGRESS].
2. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 238 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(1787) [hereinafter I FARRAND'S RECORDS].
3. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
4. Id. at 496-99.
5. Id. at 506, 514, 518-19.
6. Id. at 508.
7. Id. at 533 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 534 ("Absent a presumption one way or
the other, the best reading of the words 'undertakes to comply' is, in my judgment, one that
contemplates future action by the political branches.").
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had reached the wrong conclusion because it placed too much emphasis on
treaty language and broke from the Court's settled approach to treaty
interpretation, which called for the Court to look to a wide array of other
interpretive materials.8 The majority, in his view, "look[ed] for the wrong
thing (explicit textual expression about self-execution) using the wrong
standard (clarity) in the wrong place (the treaty language)."9
That's when they broke out the history books. Defending the majority's
reliance on the text of the treaty, Chief Justice Roberts cited two opinions by
Chief Justice Marshall, though only for the proposition that "[t]he interpretive
approach employed by the Court today-resorting to the text-is hardly
novel."' 0 Justice Breyer responded with his own account of the history. It is
"difficult to reconcile the majority's holdings with the workable Constitution
that the Founders envisaged," " he wrote. Had Chief Justice Marshall
considered the question in Medellin, he would have asked "[d]oes . . . [the]
treaty provision address the 'Judicial' Branch rather than the 'Political
Branches' of Government,"' 2 not searched for an express statement about self-
execution "the text cannot [possibly] contain." 3
Medellin drew a wave of criticism, much of it also grounded in history.
Two distinct strands of criticism arose. First, many scholars argued that the
majority's holding could not be "reconciled with any identifiable version of
originalism" because it broke with the original understanding of self-execution
in the Supremacy Clause, which these scholars contend mandates a strong
interpretive presumption that all treaties are self-executing.14 A second strand
criticized the Court's textualism as too wooden and inflexible to account for the
unique needs of modem treaty-making.' 5 Some scholars called Medellin's
textualist approach a "new paradigm"1 6 and a "normalization" of treaty
8. See id. at 541, 549-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 562 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 514. The Chief Justice's statement was itself hardly a ringing endorsement of the
historical foundations of treaty textualism.
11. Id. at 567 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 562 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
14. D. A. Jeremy Telman, Medellin and Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377, 377 (2009); see
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1601, 1617-18 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 689-90 (2008) [hereinafter
Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land]; see also David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against
Treaties? Equivalence, Duality, and Non-Self-Execution, 110 COLuM. L. REV. 2228, 2230-33 & nn.10-
18 (2010) (explaining that "scholars often cast their opposition to non-self execution in sweeping
terms"). But see Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131 (2008);
John 0. McGinnis, Medellin and the Future of International Delegation, 118 YALE L.J. 1712, 1748
(2009); John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties, 32
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1209, 1328-29 (2009); Ben Geslison, Comment, Treaties, Execution, and
Originalism in Medellin, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 767, 783 (2009); Sarah Elizabeth Nokes, Note,
Redefining the Supremacy Clause in the Global Age: Reconciling Medellin with Original Intent, 19 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 829, 830 (2011).
15. See, e.g., Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 14, at 634-36 (arguing "that
close scrutiny of treaty text" is "particularly likely to lead judges astray").
16. David J. Bederman, Medellin's New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT'L
L. 529, 530 (2008).
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interpretation that now conceives of treaties and statutes as interchangeable.17
Medellin raised but left unanswered an insistent question. To what extent
does Chief Justice Roberts's turn to treaty textualism diverge from, or comport
with, the original understanding of treaty interpretation? In an effort to answer
that question, this Article surveys the understanding of treaty interpretation in
the years leading up to the ratification of the Constitution and through the end
of the Marshall Court. The materials from this era suggest a remarkable
conclusion. The best reading of the historical record is that the Framers,
ratifiers, and the early Supreme Court thought that courts would employ highly
textual treaty interpretation not just as a matter of consensus, but as a matter of
law. At the time of the Constitution's adoption, international law dictated that
treaties were to be interpreted textually. Then-contemporary treatises on the
law of nations-authoritative accounts of the substance of international law in
the founding era and cited liberally throughout early Supreme Court treaty
interpretation decisions both under the Articles of Confederation and in the
early republic'-contained substantive guidance as to how courts and other
departments were to interpret treaties. These treatises-by Blackstone, 9
Grotius,20 Pufendorf, 1 Burlamaqui,22 and Vattel23 -held that treaties were to
be construed according to then-prevailing principles of international treaty
interpretation, which called on interpreters to rely exclusively on the text of the
treaty itself in determining its meaning. 24
This highly textual method of interpretation carried within it the seeds of
many of the most commonly expressed core commitments of modem
textualism.25 In interpreting treaties, the early Supreme Court privileged
semantic meaning over legal meaning-tendering interpretations far more
26literal than modem purposivism would. The Court also did not look to
legislative or enactment history, and gave neither deference nor great weight to
interpretations proffered by the political branches, regularly ruling against the
17. Ernest A. Young, Treaties As "Part of Our Law," 88 TEX. L. REv. 91, 136-37 (2009).
18. See Miller v. The Resolution, 17 F. Cas. 347 (Adm. Pa. 1781) af'd in part, rev'd in part, 2
U.S. I (1781).
19. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59-62.
20. 2 HuGo GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 848-83 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty
Fund 2005) (1625) (discussing the "Interpretation of a Promise or Convention").
21. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 534-52 (Basil Kennet trans.,
London, J. and J. Bonwicke et al. 5th ed. 1749) (discussing the interpretation of "Compacts and Laws").
22. 2 J. J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 220-371 (Thomas
Nugent trans., 2d ed. 1763) (1752) (discussing relations with foreign states and interpretive principles
relating to agreements between nations).
23. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 244-74 (London, G.G. &
J. Robinson 1797) (1758); see also infra Subsection III.B.1 (detailing Vattel's treatise).
24. Cf Curtis J. Mahoney, Note, Treaties As Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the
Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 834-36 (2007) (arguing that the Framers "intended courts
to interpret treaties using methods derived from the law of contracts," methods which emphasized the
importance of the text).
25. See Andrew Tutt, Fifty Shades of Textualism, 29 J.L. & POL. 309 (2014) (describing the
most common dimensions of interpretive disagreement between textualists in an effort to better
understand textualism's core commitments).
26. Id. at 314-22 (describing disputes over "privileging").
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President's preferred positions.2 The Court also self-consciously cast its
decisions as textualist-that is, bound by, and rooted fundamentally in, the
plain, unambiguous meaning of the words of the treaty itself.28 And when the
Court did look to adapt its interpretations to the circumstances of a treaty, it
looked to sources conventionally associated with textualism-history,
precedent, and tradition-rather than fundamental values or the needs of the
present moment.29 While no particular kernel or "core" unites modem or
historical textualism, these dispositions are often closely associated with
textualism, and certainly sit far removed from the tenets of modem-day
purposivism, which, as Justice Breyer explained in Medellin, would not depend
upon "explicit textual expression" or "clarity" in the "treaty language" to
confer a definitive construction upon the meaning of a treaty. 30
In its effort to illuminate the original understanding of treaty
interpretation, this Article uncovers a provocative link between the
Constitution's structure and this original understanding. The U.S. Constitution
makes several unusual institutional choices in its foreign-affairs policymaking.
Unlike England, which required in 1787 that treaties also be executed by an act
of Parliament, the U.S. Constitution makes treaties supreme law immediately
upon their ratification by the Senate.31 Additionally, the Constitution expressly
invests the federal courts with jurisdiction over cases and controversies
involving treaties, and there was little doubt in the framing era that courts-not
the political branches-were meant to be the final arbiters of the meaning of
the nation's treaty commitments.32 Given treaty interpretation's enormous
political stakes, the United States' decision to vest treaty interpretation in its
courts rather than its political branches was bold and unusual.33
The law of nations' requirement of textual treaty interpretation proves the
essential bridge that makes sense of these structural decisions.34 The United
States sought through these two design features-automatic legal effect and
judicial interpretation-to assure other nations that the United States would
scrupulously honor its treaty obligations.
But for the Framers to have thought that the decision to vest treaty
interpretation in the judiciary would work as a precommitment strategy, they
must have believed that judges could be relied upon to construe them properly
27. Id. at 322-30 (describing disputes over "ordering").
28. Id. at 330-40 (describing the importance of narration).
29. Id. at 340-44 (describing statutory adaptation); id. at 344-48 (describing statutory
integration).
30. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 562 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
31. David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Notion: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 932,
995 & n.266 (2010).
32. Id. at 994. But see id. at 1007-08 (noting that even though the courts were to be the final
arbiters with respect to interpretation, they were not necessarily expected "to have primary responsibility
for ensuring that the new government would comply with the law of nations or even treaties"-a task
the Constitution largely leaves to the political branches).
33. See id at 989-1000.
34. Id. at 1000-01.
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even if the decision would obviously harm the interests of the United States.3 5
The law of nations' textual interpretive requirements supplied this objective
guarantee. The United States federal courts-bound by the law of nations'
interpretive rules-would be forced to interpret treaties narrowly, allowing
treaty partners to trust the United States' representations that it would adhere to
its present promises in the future.
Set against this backdrop, and supported by arguments from the framing
convention and the ratification, it appears evident that the Constitution's use of
the word "treaties"-in the Supremacy Clause and elsewhere-is best read as
incorporating then-contemporaneous international law understandings of treaty
interpretation, much as Articles I, II, and III incorporate the law of nations
when they talk about "Piracies," "War," "Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls," "admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction," and "Agreement[s] or
Compact[s]" (that are not themselves treaties) between States and a "foreign
Power." As such, the balance of powers between Congress and the President,
between the federal government and the states, and between the legislative and
executive branch and the courts was struck against particular expectations
about how treaties would be interpreted. Because the Constitution's design
depends in some measure upon this textual interpretive approach, textual
construction of treaty commitments could be thought of as an interpretive rule
derived directly from the original understanding of the Constitution itself.36
This potentially draws into question the ability of present-day
instruments-including federal laws and international treaties-to alter the
United States' approach to treaty interpretation. If treaty textualism was the
expectation of the Framers in drafting the Supremacy Clause, then it would
seem that neither the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, nor any
present-day international convention, nor federal statute can require that
American courts adopt methods of treaty interpretation that vary from this
original understanding.
Part II of this Article explains the emerging literature on "original
methods" originalism and canvasses what is presently known about the original
understanding of treaty interpretation in the legal academy. Part III then
explains the original understanding of treaty interpretation as expressed by the
Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution and practiced in the Supreme Court
through the end of the Marshall Court. Finally, Part IV draws out some of the
implications for present-day treaty interpretation that might be derived from
these historical materials. This Article concludes that textual treaty
interpretation is an interpretive rule older than the Constitution-and one
presupposed by its Framers.
35. Cf id. at 977 (explaining the benefits of "[p]laying by the rules" of the European powers);
see id. at 1001-10.
36. Cf John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(2001) (arguing that the Constitution's structure shows an expectation that judges would be textualists).
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II. THE MOVE TO "ORIGINAL METHODS" ORIGINALISM
In recent years, a splinter strand of originalism has shifted from looking at
the Constitution's original substantive commitments to a focus on institutional
designs, structures, and expectations. Rather than ask how the Framers thought
the Constitution would govern a specific issue, like, say, direct taxes or the
impairment of contracts, these scholars ask how the Framers thought the
Constitution would apply to enduring questions of interpretation and
institutional orientation.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these scholars have for the most part been self-
consciously concerned with how the Constitution's Framers and ratifiers
thought the constitutional document itself would be interpreted in the future.37
The neologism "original methods" originalism originates in just such an article,
concerned with "the interpretive methods that the constitutional enactors would
have deemed applicable to it."38
But one easily sees that expectations about how statutes, treaties, and
other legal instruments would be interpreted would have been an equally
essential, if unexpressed, element of the Constitution's overarching design.
Methods of statutory interpretation that failed to respect legislative language
would have proven disastrous in a system that makes enacting laws as difficult
as ours does. The very difficulty of enacting legislation under the Constitution
would thus seem to imply something about the Framers' and ratifiers'
expectations about how statutes would be interpreted. 39 Recognizing this,
Professor Manning has researched original methods of statutory interpretation
at length, concluding that the Constitution's structure, along with the practice
of judges at and around the time of the Constitution's adoption, strongly
support the proposition that the document's Framers and ratifiers thought
judges would engage in faithful-agent, rather than equitable, statutory
interpretation.40
Professor Manning's investigation naturally raises further questions.
Might there have been an original understanding of treaty interpretation? How
might it have aligned with and diverged from the original understanding of
statutory interpretation? Should it have any bearing on how treaties are
interpreted today?
Scholarly efforts to explore this issue have so far been limited. Professor
Yoo has offered an opinion on the original understanding of treaty
37. See, e.g., Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical
Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 519 (2003); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REv. 885 (1984).
38. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New
Theory ofInterpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 751 (2009).
39. See John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 1648, 1651 (2001).
40. Id.; see Manning, supra note 36, at 9-10. For an opposing effort, see William N. Eskridge,
Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-
1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (2001).
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interpretation: that the President was probably intended to have nearly
exclusive authority to interpret treaties. 41 According to Professor Yoo, the
original understanding of the role of courts in treaty interpretation was that they
look to the interpretation tendered by the executive branch and endorse it.42
This renders debates over the proper method of treaty interpretation-whether
textual or otherwise-moot. Professor Yoo's textual and structural argument
for almost complete presidential control over treaty interpretation is largely
consistent with-if not a strand of-his larger theory that the President was
intended to play a predominant role in foreign affairs.43
But unlike Professor Yoo's scrupulous work describing presidential
power over other areas of foreign affairs, his investigation into the historical
understanding of treaty interpretation is hasty: a few citations to The Federalist
Papers, excerpts from the constitutional convention, and ratification debates,44
a case study involving President Washington's 1793 Neutrality Proclamation,45
and references to his own other works.46 From this, Professor Yoo tentatively
concludes that "it seems that the Framers' early practice assumed that the
President enjoyed the plenary power to interpret treaties."47
In the years following Professor Yoo's effort some scholars have engaged
with his work, but none have presented a convincing alternative account.
Professor Sloss challenged Professor Yoo's claim that the President was
understood to have plenary treaty interpretation powers by surveying treaty-
interpretation cases in which the United States was a party from 1789 through
1838 to see if the Supreme Court deferred to the President's interpretation of
41. John Yoo, Politics As Law? The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers,
and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 851, 883 (2001) (reviewing FRANCES FITZGERALD, WAY
OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, STAR WARS AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR (2000)).
42. See id; see also John C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of
Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1305, 1310 (2002) ("Politics as Law concluded that treaty interpretation
has to rest with the President due to his management of foreign policy and his constitutional control over
the interpretation of international law on behalf of the United States.")
43. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1963, 1966 (1999) ("The President exercises a
broad foreign affairs power that derives from these provisions [Article II, Section 2], from Article II's
vesting of the executive Power .... ) [hereinafter, Yoo, Globalism]; John C. Yoo, The Continuation of
Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 174
(1996) [hereinafter Yoo, Politics by Other Means] (arguing that the Framers intended Congress to have
a very circumscribed role in war-making, exercised through control over appropriations and
impeachment rather than legislative limitations on Executive action); John C. Yoo, Rejoinder, Treaties
and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2218, 2226 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaties] ("In foreign relations, then, the story of constitutional
development played out by unifying executive powers in a national Presidency (or, in the case of the
treaty power, in the President and Senate) and by creating a national legislature that balanced executive
authority through its traditional powers over legislation and funding.").
44. In these ratification debates, support for Professor Yoo's specific conclusion that treaties
were to be entirely the President's to interpret could be charitably described as oblique. See Yoo, supra
note 41, at 888-94.
45. Id. at 895-901.
46. Professor Yoo has since codified all of his views into a single theory of presidential power
over foreign affairs. See JOHN C. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005). The arguments, however, seem not to have improved, at least
with respect to treaty interpretation.
47. See Yoo, supra note 41, at 901.
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48the treaty's terms. He found it did not. But Professor Sloss's effort was
limited to a survey, and directed exclusively to the question of deference, rather
than the more nuanced question of how the Court engaged in the substance of
judicial interpretation in the peried. As such, while a theory of total presidential
deference includes an account of the proper approach to treaty interpretation in
the judiciary, Professor Sloss's conclusion that there was no deference does not
go the extra step of explaining what manner of interpretation, precisely, was
being used by the Supreme Court of the era to resolve difficult treaty
interpretation questions.
Thus, Professor Yoo's work remains unique in its focus on historical
arguments about how, precisely, treaties were meant to be interpreted by
judges. At the time he wrote his article, he was unable to find another scholar
who had engaged in any significant search for the original understanding of
treaty interpretation.49 Since Yoo's inquiry a little over a decade ago, little
progress has been made. No scholar has performed a thorough examination of
the original understanding of treaty interpretation in the years since, though
many have written about other historical aspects of treaty-making and treaty
practice. While other scholars have engaged in examinations of treaty
48. See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations, 62
N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 497, 505-23 (2007).
49. See Yoo, supra note 41, at 882-83 (explaining that "[w]hile much work on the original
understanding of the treaty power has recently appeared. .. [s]cholars of the Framing have not devoted
as much investigation to the question of the allocation of power among the branches after the ratification
of a treaty."). Professor Michael Van Alstine, in a contemporaneous article responding to Professor
Yoo's, sought to refute Professor Yoo's understanding, but through functionalist and contemporary
doctrinal arguments, rather than through a historical investigation. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The
Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1263 (2002) [hereinafter Van Alstine, The
Judicial Power]; Yoo, supra note 42, at 1307 ("[T]he separation of powers and federalism require a
clear distinction between treaties and statutes, and Professor Van Alstine provides no compelling reason,
rooted in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution, for erasing that textual barrier."). Notably,
Professor Van Alstine, like Professor Yoo, explains that "[s]urprisingly . . . the matter of treaty
interpretation has thus far received only limited scholarly attention," Van Alstine, supra at 1266 & n. 16,
citing a small number of published Articles, all of which were about contemporary treaty interpretation
practice and theory. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 953, 954 (1994) (explaining that the article's goal will be to provide a constructive account of the
practice of treaty interpretation in U.S. federal courts); Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 692 (1998) [hereinafter Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty
Interpretation] (explaining that the article will attempt to demonstrate that "new" textualism is ill-
equipped to grapple with the needs of contemporary treatymaking); James C. Wolf, Comment, The
Jurisprudence of Treaty Interpretation, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1023, 1024-25 (1988) (commenting on
the norms of treaty interpretation set forth in the Restatement (Revised) of the Law of Foreign Relations
and noting their conflict with customary international law and United States law).
50. See Robert Anderson IV, "Ascertained in A Different Way": The Treaty Power at the
Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 203-09 (2001);
Bradford R. Clark Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1580-94 (2007);
Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1243, 1251-54 (2005); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MIcH. L. REV. 1075, 1100-1257
(2000); Duncan B. Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomer, "Political" Commitments and the Constitution, 49
VA. J. INT'L L. 507, 558-72 (2009); J. Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated Power to Define
and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 872-96 (2007); Vasan Kesavan,
The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1479, 1514-1612 (2006); Mahoney, supra note 24,
at 834-38; Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
833, 851-62 (2007); Ryan D. Newman, Treaty Rights and Remedies: The Virtues ofA Clear Statement
Rule, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 419, 427-33 (2007); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in
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interpretation, such as Professors Van Alstine, Bederman, Chesney, and
Glasshauser, their efforts have not been rooted in efforts to excavate the
original understanding of treaty interpretation.5 1
We lack a definitive account-even a definitive investigation-of the
original understanding of treaty interpretation. A more refined appreciation
might have significant implications for our understanding of how treaties
should be interpreted today. In particular, it might shed important light on how
powers were meant to be distributed and exercised between three coequal
branches, and between the federal government and the states.
III. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
The following Part presents an overview of the legal, philosophical, and
jurisprudential backdrop against which the U.S. Constitution was drafted and
against which the early Supreme Court first construed the young nation's early
international treaties. This context is critical to understanding precisely how
and why these documents were written and implemented as they were, and they
are highly illuminating regarding the original understanding of the proper
interpretation of treaty commitments. If one were asked to guess, it would not
be entirely implausible to believe, as Justice Breyer posited in Medellin, that
treaties were meant to be interpreted broadly and flexibly, with more of an eye
to their purposes, drafting history, and the circumstances in which they were
ratified than to their text. Nor would it be particularly implausible before
reviewing the history to believe, as Professor Yoo has argued, that treaties were
meant to be more political than legal-subject to liberal post-enactment
"interpretation" by the political branches to better serve the needs of the nation
at any particular moment.
Yet the legal ideology of the Founding era, as expounded by the jurists,
philosophers, and statesmen that the Founding generation held in high esteem,
reveal that these two postulates are far off the mark. As the remainder of this
Part endeavors to show, strict fidelity to the plain meaning of enacted text was
the most central interpretive commitment of lawyers of the era, a commitment
expounded by nearly every authoritative international legal scholar of the age,
and one that permeated the authoritative legal texts used in the teaching and
practice of law in the Founding era.
A. The "Most Highly Qualified Publicists" and the Late Eighteenth-
Century Law ofNations
One of the primary ways eighteenth-century lawyers were socialized into
Treaty Jurisprudence andA Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1895-907 (2005).
51. See, e.g., Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, supra note 49; David J. Bederman,
Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights As Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1439 (1999); Robert
M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92
IoWA L. REv. 1723 (2007); Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50
VILL. L. REv. 25 (2005).
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law was through a series of authoritative legal texts.52 These texts, in some
ways precursors to the modem casebook, treatise and case reporter all rolled
into one, set forth general legal principles rooted in old cases, biblical passages,
ancient legal codes, and moral principles. 53 But unlike either modem treatises
or casebooks, these works were considered authoritative statements of the law
and their rules and principles were suitable for use in courts and legislatures.
They were freely cited in judicial proceedings 54 and political debates.5 5 In
settings where matters of law or legality might call for an appeal to a higher
authority, their names were likely to be mentioned. As John Adams wrote
admiringly of James Otis, for example, he was "a great master of the law of
nature and nations. He had read Puffendorf, Grotius, Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui,
Vattel, Heineccius .. . It was a maxim which he inculcated in his pupils, 'that a
lawyer ought never to be without a volume of natural or public law, or moral
philosophy, on his table or in his pocket."' 56 Such an expertise was expected of
an educated lawyer of the time. It would thus not have been unusual for a
lawyer in the Supreme Court to salt his arguments with phrases like "Sir
,,57 ,5William Blackstone, therefore, considers it . . . , "Blackstone tells us . . .
or "the language of Vattel [is] . . . ."59
American lawyers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
were well acquainted with William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
60 61England, Sir Matthew Bacon's A New Abridgment of the Law, Hugo
Grotius's On the Law of War and Peace, Samuel von Pufendorf s Of the Law
of Nature and Nations, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui's The Principles of Natural
and Politic Law, and most importantly Emerich de Vattel's The Law of
Nations.62 These are only a small subset of the treatises then in circulation that
52. See Brian J. Moline, Early American Legal Education, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 775, 779
(2003).
53. WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES FROM LUTHER TO
MONTESQUIEU 163 (1913).
54. See, e.g., infra notes 351-353.
55. See, e.g., infra notes 73-73, 162, 203 (describing such instances).
56. John Adams, Letter of John Adams to H. Niles 14 January, 1818, in 10 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 274, 275 (Charles Francis Adams, ed., 1856)
(emphasis omitted).
57. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 145 (1795).
58. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 17 (1800) (emphasis omitted).
59. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 254 (1796).
60. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 31
(1967); see also Eskridge, supra note 40, at 1003 (naming Blackstone as the colonists' main authority on
the common law); Manning, supra note 36, at 35 (citing Blackstone as the most widely read English law
treatise in late eighteenth-century America).
61. George C. Thomas III, Stumbling Toward History: The Framers' Search and Seizure
World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 199, 220 (2010).
62. See BAILYN, supra note 60, at 27; RAY FORREST HARVEY, JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI:
A LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 75, 79-175 (1937); DONALD S. LUTZ, A
PREFACE TO AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 113-40 (1992); FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 7, 60 (1985); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 259-305 (1969); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the
Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843,
859-65 (1978); M. H. Hoeflich, Translation & the Reception ofForeign Law in the Antebellum United
States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 770-71 (2002). Vattel is the most important of the writers on the subject
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purported to unify legal, moral, and political principles into coherent
frameworks for the design and administration of government.
When it came to international law, treatises that purported to set out the
rules of the law of nations were even more authoritative. 64 Because
pronouncements on the law of nations by courts and legislatures were
somewhat rare and difficult to find, treatises were often used as evidence of
binding international law and its principles. This heightened authoritativeness
is still built into international law today. Article 38(1) of the International Court
of Justice statute advises, for instance, that "the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations," are to be treated as evidence of
customary international law. Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel are still on the
list today.67
While these writers are often cited for their arguments on the substance of
international law, and are occasionally cited to note that courts and scholars
once thought of treaties like contracts,68 contemporary scholars have uniformly
overlooked the fact that nearly all of these writers actually set out detailed rules
for interpreting these instruments.69 Not only did they set out interpretive rules:
the rules they set out were cited by the Court of Appeals for Prize Cases under
the Articles of Confederation and later by the Supreme Court well into the early
American Republic. These interpretive rules guided Supreme Court
deliberations in giving effect to American treaty commitments both before and
after the ratification of the Constitution.
both because he was the most widely-read, well-known, and well-respected writer on the law of nations
in the early republic and because "Vattel's chapter on 'The Interpretation of Treaties' probably
represents the most detailed discussion of the subject by any author of a general treatise." H.
Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of
Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 48, 48 (1949).
63. For example, Alexander Hamilton directed the loyalist farmer, in debates over whether to
sever ties with England because England had lost the right to rule the colonies due to its abuses, to
"[a]pply [him]self, without delay, to the study of. . . Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, and
Burlemaqui," demonstrating the influence these writers had on the thinking of the Framers in conceiving
of the proper role of government. Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, &c., reprinted in 1 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON DIGITAL EDITION (Harold C. Syrett ed., 2011). Hamilton added: "I
might mention other excellent writers on this subject [the law of nature and nations]; but if you attend,
diligently, to these, you will not require any others." Id.; see also, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S.
Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REv. 545, 570 (2004).
64. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 163 (1895)).
65. Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV.
819, 824 (1989); see also Yoo, Politics by Other Means, supra note 43, at 243 (noting that Grotius,
Vattel, Burlemaqui, and Pufendorf had a greater influence on the Framers than "publicists" do upon
lawyers today).
66. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 993.
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 1,
intro. Note, reporters' note 1, at 21 (1987).
68. See, e.g., Glashausser, supra note 50, at 1267-68.
69. Professor Ramsey has come closest to recognizing that textualism formed an integral
element of international law in the founding era, but stops short of a full-fledged exploration. See
Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1543, 1635-36 (2002).
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B. Interpretation According to Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf Burlamaqui,
Rutherforth, Bacon, and Blackstone
The following subsections briefly explain the fame, significance, and core
tenets of the jurisprudential philosophies of the most important authorities on
international law in the Founding era regarding matters of interpretation.
Because their views were thought to be authoritative with respect to the content
of the law of nations-and as the following sections show were familiar to and
closely read by the Framers-their views regarding the proper approach to
international treaty interpretation shed important light on the jurisprudential
context in which the Constitution was drafted and ratified and against which
treaties were interpreted in the decades following its ratification.
1. Vattel's The Law ofNations
Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767) was a Swiss philosopher, diplomat, and
legal expert whose The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature,
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns appeared in
French in 1758 and within two years had been translated into a bevy of
languages, including English.70 The work was one of a collection of
eighteenth-century works that sought to set out a definitive account of the
principles of the law of nations.7'
Early American lawyers and jurists were exuberant Vattelophiles. 72 His
name appeared in congressional debates, 73 ratifying and framing
7475 76
conventions,74 judicial opinions, and treatises. He was the "most popular"
70. Albert de Lapradelle, Introduction to EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR
THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW xxvii, xxix (Charles G. Fenwik & George D. Gregory trans.,
Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758).
71. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations As Part of the National Law of the United
States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 35 (1952); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the
(Non) Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 166 (1998).
72. Robert J. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington
Administration, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 373, 404-05 (2012). As Lapradelle declared, "Of all the authors,
even the English, who have written on the law of nations, there is not one who is more often nor more
extensively cited than Vattel." Lapradelle, supra note 70, at xxxiv. See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 161 (1954); Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law as Sword or
Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 67
(1999). Even though they were Vatellophiles, however, they may not have been entirely "Vattelian." See
Brian Richardson, The Use of Vattel in the American Law ofNations, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 547 (2012).
73. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2230-31 (1797) (statement of Rep. Swanwick); 4 ANNALS OF CONG.
749-52 (1796) (statement of Rep. Smith)
74. James Madison cited Vattel at the Constitutional Convention, see James Madison, Journal
(June 27, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 437-38, 440, and James Wilson
did so at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, see James Wilson, Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 4,
1787), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 454 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 2d ed. 1881) [hereinafter
ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
75. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 123 (1812);
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 225 (1796); Miller v. The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1, 15
(1781) (citing Vattel as a "celebrated writer on the law of nations").
76. See, e.g., DANIEL GARDNER, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-101, 243 (Troy,
N. Tuttle ed. 1844) (citing Vattel's views on national sovereignty and treaty formation); see also JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (J.T. Abby ed., Cambridge, Deighton, Bell & Co.
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and the "most elegant" writer on the law of nations and the most widely cited.
His "was the manual of the student, the reference work of the statesman, and
the text from which the political philosopher drew inspiration. Publicists
considered it sufficient to cite the authority of Vattel to justify and give
conclusiveness and force to statements as to the proper conduct of a state in its
international relations."78
In 1773, The Law of Nations was taught at Columbia University (then
King's College).79 In 1775, Benjamin Franklin received three copies of a new
edition on behalf of the Continental Congress and in thanking his friend
Charles Dumas for sending them he remarked that they "came to us in good
season, when the circumstances of a rising State make it necessary to
frequently consult the law of nations" and that "[the book] has been continually
in the hands of the members of our Congress now sitting."80 Centuries after his
death it was found that George Washington had a number of overdue library
books. One of them was The Law of Nations. Esteem for Vattel was even a
rare point of common ground for Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson.
To Hamilton, Vattel was one of "the most approved writers on the laws of
Nations." 82 Jefferson once remarked that "we will not assume the exclusive
right of saying what th[e] law [of nature] and usage [of nations] is. Let us
appeal to enlightened and disinterested judges. None is more so than Vattel."83
Vattel's treatise "undoubtedly was used by some of the members of the Second
Continental Congress, which sat at Philadelphia; by the leading men who
subsequently directed the policy of the united Colonies until the end of the
[Revolutionary] war; and later by the men who sat in the Constitutional
Convention of 1787-89 and framed up the Constitution of the United States."8
The Law of Nations is known principally, if rather unsurprisingly, for its
account of the substance of the law of nations. Almost totally absent from
1878) (praising Vattel as the most elegant writer on the law of nations).
77. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 18 (New York, 0. Halfsted 1826).
78. Charles G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel, 7 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 395, 395 (1913).
79. Lapradelle, supra note 70, at xxix.
80. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Charles F. W. Duman, (Dec. 19, 1775) in 2 FRANCIS
WHARTON, THE REVOLuTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 64, 64 (Washington, Government
Printing Office 1889). St. George Tucker's early treatise also relies on Vattel. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES app. at 310 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch &
Abraham Small 1803).
81. The books were due November 2, 1789. It seems Washington accrued over $300,000 in
fines. See Kathleen Parker, Finally, a Library for Our First President, WASH. POST., Apr. 21, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/20/AR2010042003527.html; George
Washington's 221-Year Overdue Library Book: A Timeline, THE WEEK, May 21, 2010,
http://theweek.com/article/index/203282/george-washingtons-22 I -year-overdue-library-book-a-timeline.
82. Alexander Hamilton, Remarks on the Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation Lately
Made Between the United States and Great Britain (July 9-11, 1795), in 18 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 404, 413 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973).
83. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Sec'y of State, to Genet, Minister Plenipotentiary of Fr.
(June 17, 1793), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 154, 154 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds.,
Washington, Gales and Seaton 1833).
84. THOMAS WILLING BACH, THE UNITED STATES AND THE EXPANSION OF THE LAW
BETWEEN NATIONS 3 (1915).
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contemporary analysis of Vattel's seminal work is his lengthy discussion of
treaty interpretation. Nonetheless, Chapter XVII of Book II is titled "Of the
Interpretation of Treaties" and its first section, numbered 262 is on the
necessity of establishing rules of interpretation.85 Vattel thought it necessary to
establish fixed, uniform rules of interpretation in order to avoid "uncertain[ty]"
and "duplicity in forming the compact."86 Vattel thus set out five general
interpretive maxims, from which dozens of others would ultimately spring, but
which at root encompassed the primary rules of interpretation:
§263-First General Maxim: If text is clear no additional "interpretation"
should be done.88
§264-Second General Maxim: If one "could and ought to have explained
himself' and has not done so, it is to his own detriment.89
§265-Third General Maxim: Neither of the contracting parties "has a right to
interpret" the treaty "according to his own fancy."9
§266-Fourth General Maxim: Manifestations in the treaty are to be taken as
truthful.91
[§267, a minor qualification to §266, is omitted] ....
§268-Fifth General Maxim: Interpretation ought to be made according to
"certain fixed" rules "as naturally understood by the parties concerned, at the
time when the deed was drawn up and accepted."9
Vattel followed upon his five maxims with a detailed list of canons of
treaty construction tailored to specific issues that might arise in treaty cases. No
party could claim they did not understand how a treaty would be construed if
the maxims were set out in advance. A sampling of Vattel's further rules
provides:
§271-The terms are to be interpreted according to their common usage.93
§272-The usage of terms should be that usage common at the time the
instrument was drafted. 4
§282-We ought to reject every interpretation that "leads to an absurdity."95
§287-Interpretation may be founded on the reason of the deed, but we ought
85. VATTEL, supra note 23, at 244.
86. Id.
87. Where appropriate, I have paraphrased and clarified the translations in this Section.
88. Id. at 244-45.
89. Id. at 245.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 245-46.
92. Id. at 246.
93. Id. at 248.
94. Id. at 248-49.
95. Id. at 252.
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to be very certain that we know the true and only reason of the law.9
And so on through §322. Vattel's thirty-page chapter consists of sixty
interpretive rules and is replete with dozens of examples and explanations.
Several of the chapter's later sections go on to describe how interpreters are to
deal with progressively harder cases, such as conflicts between "two laws, two
promises, or two treaties, when a case occurs in which it is impossible to fulfill
both at the same time"97 (sections 311-322) and what to do in those instances
where purpose cannot be divined (sections 301-310). 9 The structure of the
chapter makes evident that interpreters are to begin with the more definite
linguistic rules in the early sections and only proceed to the later sections as the
interpretive issues present in the case become more difficult.9  As Vattel writes
at the outset, "[h]owever luminous each clause may be,-however clear and
precise the terms in which the deed is couched,-all this will be of no avail, if it
be allowed to go in quest of extraneous arguments to prove that it is not to be
understood in the sense which it naturally presents."'0
Vattel's chapter is striking both for its textualism and its ironclad
commitment to faithful-agent interpretation. As Vattel notes early on,
[T]he sole object of the lawful interpretation of a deed ought to be the discovery
of the thoughts of the author or authors of that deed,-whenever we meet with
any obscurity in it, we are to consider what probably were the ideas of those
who drew up the deed, and to interpret it accordingly. This is the general rule
for all interpretations. 01
While Vattel acknowledges that occasionally the treaty interpreter will
need to resort to interpretive tools outside the scope of the author's actual
original intention-such as custom or general purposes in cases of true textual
ambiguity-he repeatedly cautions that such moves are "dangerous"
demanding "certainty,,102 and "circumspect[ion]."' 3 "In most cases," wrote
Vattel, "it is extremely probable that the parties have expressed themselves
conformably to the established usage [of language]: and such probability ever
affords a strong presumption, which cannot be over-ruled but by a still stronger
presumption to the contrary." 104
Vattel's textualism is, in other words, motivated primarily by institutional
considerations of honesty, transparency, and faithful-agency that have not
changed much in kind or degree since he wrote in the 1750s.
96. Id. at 256.
97. Id. at 271.
98. Id. at 264-71.
99. See Lauterpacht, supra note 62, at 48 (reaching the same conclusion from the structure of
the chapter). This is a step-wise textualist approach reminiscent of William Eskridge and Philip
Frickey's famous "funnel of abstraction." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation As Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 353 (1990).
100. VATTEL, supra note 23, at 244-45 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 247.
102. Id. at 256.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 248.
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2. Grotius's The Rights of War and Peace
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was a Dutch legal scholar whose The Rights of
War and Peace appeared in Latin in 1625. os Widely considered one of
international law's seminal works, o0 The Rights of War and Peace has led
many, James Madison among them, to declare Grotius "the father of the
modern code of nations."1
07
Grotius's words, much like Vattel's, were stitched to the lapels of early
American lawyers and legislators. Like Vattel, citations to Grotius appear in
astonishing numbers at the founding and after. 08 And unlike The Law of
Nations, George Washington actually owned his copy of The Rights of War and
Peace.lo9 The Library Company of Philadelphia-to which Franklin sent one
of Dumas's copies of The Law of Nations-listed four copies of The Rights of
War and Peace in its 1807 catalog.1 0 John Jay christened his legal career "by
carefully reading through Grotius 'De Jure Belli et Pacis."'"" As the book
appears at the top of John Witherspoon's 1769 syllabus for students entering
Princeton (then the College of New Jersey), it probably christened Madison's
undergraduate education as well. 112 Madison later recommended that the
Continental Congress acquire and its members read the book,1 3 and, with
Hamilton, invoked Grotius in The Federalist Papers.114
Like Vattel's The Law of Nations, Grotius' Rights of War and Peace is
known to modem scholars principally for its exposition of the substantive
rights and obligations of nations in the international sphere.115 However, like
Vattel who wrote after him, Grotius too saw the necessity of laying down a
system of rules for treaty interpretation. Unlike the famously lucid Vattel,
Grotius' section on interpretation requires some of its own, but nonetheless,
Chapter Sixteen, titled "Of Interpretation, or the Way of explaining the Sense
105. The title has also been variously translated as The Law of War and Peace and On the Laws
of War and Peace.
106. John MacDonell, The Influence of Grotius, in 5 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUs SOCIETY:
PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND WAR xvii, xvii-xxiii (1919); William Rattigan, Hugo Grotius, 6 J. SOC'Y
COMP. LEGIS. 68, 68-81 (1905); Charles J. Reid, Jr., Hugo Grotius: A Case of Dubious Paternity, 10
GREEN BAG 2D 109, 109-23 (2006).
107. James Madison, Examination of the British Doctrine Which Subjects to Capture a Neutral
Trade Not Open in Time ofPeace, in 2 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1794-1815,
at 229, 234 (Philip R. Fendall ed., 1865). Praise for Grotius tends to the superlative. See, e.g., David B.
Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller's Lesson for the World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REv. 235,
242 (2008) ("Hugo Grotius, [is] the most important writer of all time in international law. .
108. See supra notes 62-63.
109. Richardson, supra note 72, at 549.
110. CATALOG OF THE BOOKS BELONGING TO THE LIBRARY COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA 115
(Philadelphia, Bartram & Reynolds 1807) [hereinafter CATALOG] (listing two in English and two in
Latin).
111. GEORGE PELLEW, JOHN JAY 12 (Cambridge, The Riverside Press 1895).
112. Dennis F. Thompson, The Education of a Founding Father: The Reading List for John
Witherspoon's Course in Political Theory, as Taken by James Madison, 4 POL. THEORY 523, 525
(1976).
113. Id.
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 20, at 135 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
115. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 69, at 1570-71 (describing Grotius' influence).
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of a Promise or Convention,"116 displays a textualism nearly as strong as
Vattel's. Planting seeds that would one day take root in Vattel's work, Grotius
wrote that "[B]ecause the inward Acts and Motions of the Mind are not in
themselves discernible . . . therefore some certain Rule must be agreed on."117
Having motivated his inquiry, Grotius, like Vattel, sets out an assortment of
interpretive maxims that progress from text, to purpose, to considerations of
circumstance and effect, stepping from each level only if the prior level of
abstraction is insufficient to end the interpretive inquiry.1
Grotius sets out his interpretive rules in a numbered fashion (much like
Vattel later would), beginning with:" 9
I.1. For promises to have any worth, they must be susceptible to objective
interpretation.120
1.2. "The best Rule of Interpretation is to guess at the Will by the most probable
Signs, which Signs are of two Sorts, Words and Conjectures; which are
sometimes considered separately, sometimes together."'21
II. "Words [are] to be understood as commonly taken unless there are good
Conjectures to the contrary."1 22
III. "Terms of Art are to be explained according to the respective Art they
belong to."m2
IV.1. "Conjectures are necessary, when Words and Sentences are . . .
Ambiguous" or "A seeming Contradiction."24
IV.2. "And sometimes the Conjectures themselves are so plain, that they carry
116. GROTIUS, supra note 23, at 848.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 848-83.
119. As was the case with Vattel, where appropriate, I have paraphrased and clarified the
translations in this Section.
120. GROTIUS, supra note 23, at 848.
121. Id. at 848-49. By "Conjectures" Grotius seems merely to mean ambiguities in the text. I
quote this text because Blackstone clearly read it in preparing his Commentaries, using many of the
same words and even grammatical constructions. It is difficult to read the two texts side-by-side without
concluding that Blackstone did a fair amount of borrowing directly from Grotius' test. Wrote
Blackstone, "[t]he fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring
his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these
signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and
reason of the law." BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *59. Indeed, Grotius's first nine Roman-numbered
interpretive rules seem to have formed the substance of Blackstone's interpretive system, a system that
would later inform Justice Story's system in his own Commentaries. See 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 283 (2d ed. photo. reprint 2005) (1851)
(citing BLACKSTONE *59-60) (remarking "Mr. Justice Blackstone has remarked, that the intention of a
law is to be gathered from the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the
reason and spirit of the law"). Grotius has been called the father of international law, but he may also
have a strong paternal claim to American statutory interpretation.
122. GROTIUS, supra note 23, at 849.




us to a Sense contrary to the more common Acceptation of the Words." 25
It is worth pausing here, as Grotius' Fourth Rule could be read broadly or
narrowly. A broad reading would upset the contention that Grotius was a strong
textualist. It could imply that Grotius here is saying that the "spirit" of a text
can overcome its plain meaning. He himself says there is a difference between
the ex scripto and the sententia scripti (distinguishing between the words and
the sense of the words).126
But Grotius, ever thorough, explains his understanding of Rule IV by way
of an enormous number of examples drawn from ancient promises-examples
that show, by their very narrowness, just how limited he thought the scope of
the interpreter's discretion is. Wrote Grotius:
So the word Arms sometimes signifies Instruments of War, sometimes armed
Soldiers, and is to be interpreted either in this or that Sense, as the Matter in
hand requires. So he who has promised to restore Men, must restore them
living, and not dead; not to trick and cavil as the Plataeans did. So when People
are required to lay down their Iron, (Ferrum) they satisfy the Order, if they lay
down their Weapons without their Buckles, as Pericles with his Shifts and
Quirks pretended. And by a free going out of a City, is meant a safe Conduct,
contrary to what Alexander did. And by leaving half the Ships, is meant half of
the number of the Ships, whole, not cut in two, as the Romans basely dealt
with Antiochus. The same Judgment may be formed in other like Cases.127
Not satisfied that his point has been completely made, Grotius provides still
more examples. 128 He describes an incident in which Brasidas, "having
promised to depart out of the Land of the Boeotians," chose instead to remain
with his army, on the grounds that wherever his army was encamped obviously
did not belong to the Boeotians.129 He describes how, when Homer's Menelaus
and Paris agreed that Helen would belong to the "Conqueror," both understood
"Conqueror" not in its literal sense, but to mean he who killed the other.13 0 He
describes how, if a gift is promised in obvious anticipation of a marriage, the
gift need not be given if no marriage is consummated.131 He describes how a
genus may be limited to one species peculiarly associated with it, 13 how the
masculine can encompass both genders, 3 3 and how "death" can mean either
125. Id. at 851-52.
126. Id. at 852.
127. Id. at 853.
128. Early in the chapter, Grotius gives another example, later borrowed by Pufendorf, see
PUFENDORF, supra note 21, at 545: the Locrians put dirt in their shoes and garlic on their shoulders and
then promised that they would keep faith with a peace treaty so long as they carried "Heads" on their
shoulders, and trod upon the "Earth." Grotius argued that they could not escape their commitment by
casting the garlic heads from their shoulders and the earth from their shoes. GROTIUS, supra note 23, at
849.
129. Id. at 854.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 855.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 856.
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literal death or the figurative death of banishment.134
These understandings of appropriate instances of deviation from
otherwise clear text are not only consistent with proper textualism, but
absolutely essential to it.135 As Justice Antonin Scalia once put it, "a good
textualist is not a literalist." Neither was Grotius. As The Rights of War and
Peace conveys with great charm and candor, Grotius's understanding of what it
meant to speak of the law's "spirit" was considerably less expansive than that
invoked by some later jurists. 137 His interpretive rules evince a careful,
thoughtful textualism, much like Vattel's. And like Vattel, Grotius took
interpretation seriously, outlining thirty-two interpretive rules, some with
multiple sub-rules, spanning thirty-five pages.138
3. Pufendorf's Of the Law ofNature and Nations
Baron Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) was a German law professor
and historian whose Of the Law of Nature and Nations appeared in 1672.139
Like the works of Grotius and Vattel, Pufendorf's Law of Nature and
Nations-though not as outlandishly popular-nonetheless secreted itself onto
the bookshelves of early American lawyers, ready and waiting for deployment
in moments of urgent need.'4 It appeared second (after Grotius's book) on
Witherspoon's syllabus of works for the class entering Princeton (then the
College of New Jersey) in 1769-and as such was likely among the first works
Madison read there.141 The Library Company of Philadelphia listed two copies
of The Law of Nature and Nations in its 1807 catalog,142 and the book was
among the first volumes that Benjamin Franklin purchased for the Library at its
founding. 143 When Robert Morris wrote from Philadelphia during the
Constitutional Convention to his sons in Europe that "[t]he law of Nations, a
knowledge of the Germanic system and the Constitutions of the several
134. Id.
135. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 38, at 797 ("[I]nterpreting an ambiguous provision
to accord with its spirit is consistent with textualism. It is only when the spirit takes priority over the text
that one raises questions under textualism."); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1835
(2010) (describing textualism).
136. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 24 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
137. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
138. The rules, like Vattel's, gradually broaden to tackle situations calling for greater and
greater abstraction, such as circumstances in which promises conflict or where certain substantive
commitments conflict with promises made.
139. David Saunders, 'Within the Orbit of This Life'-Samuel Pufendorf and the Autonomy of
Law, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 2173, 2174 (2002).
140. See supra notes 62-63.
141. Thompson, supra note 112, at 525. As Thompson notes, "Others who were students in the
College at the same time as Madison, and were likely to have been exposed to Witherspoon's course,
include: John Beatty, Hugh Brackenridge, Gunning Bradford, William Bradford, Aaron Burr, Philip
Freneau, John Henry, Henry Lee, Morgan Lewis, Aaron Ogden, and Caleb Wallace." Id. at 529 n.5.
142. CATALOG, supra note 110, at 16, 217.
143. Edwin Wolf, The First Books and Printed Catalogues of the Library Company of
Philadelphia, 78 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 45, 57 (1954).
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Governments in Europe, and an intimate acquaintance with ancient and modern
history are essentially necessary to entitle you to participate in the honor of
serving . . . in the administration of this Government" it is not fanciful to
imagine he was advising them to consult the German Pufendorfs Law of
Nature and Nations.1"
Pufendorf was principally known as a natural law theorist, but like Vattel
and Grotius, Pufendorf's writings were meant to convey principles of law as
part of an integrated whole, and so like them, he included a chapter on
interpretation: Chapter XII, "Of the Interpretation of Compacts and Laws.",1
45
Pufendorf, like Grotius, thought objective interpretation necessary to enable
binding promises to be made at all, and so argued that a system susceptible to
objective interpretation was a necessity.146 Pufendorf's section is not as unique
as Grotius's and Vattel's because he lifts much of his chapter from Grotius,
often word-for-word, right down to Grotius's examples.147 Merely outlining
the heads of each of his twenty-three rules reveals the same progression from
linguistic rules to more difficult cases requiring greater abstraction. Pufendorf's
chapter on interpretation explains the following precepts of interpretation:148
[Rules I and 1I, explaining the need to create interpretive rules, are omitted]
III. The Words are ordinarily to be understood according to the common
Usage. And
IV. Words of Art according to the Art.
V. Conjecture is sufficient, when Words are dubious.
VI. Or seem to contradict one another.
VII. Conjectures must be taken from the Matter treated on.
VIII. From the Effect, or
IX. From the Coherence, Original, and Place.
X. How the Sense may be gathered from the Reason of them.
XI. Some Words have both a large and a strict Signification.
XII. Some Things are favourable, others odious.
XIII. Rules are to be made from these Distinctions.
XIV. An Example of Two who came to the Goal together.
XV. How this Order is to be interpreted. No Man must wage War without
the Command of another.
144. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 241 (1928).
145. PUFENDORF, supra note 21, at 534.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., id. at 535-36. But see id. at 536 (contradicting Grotius's definition of the word
"Army").
148. The following is transposed from PUFENDORF, supra note 21, at 534.
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XVI. Of these Words, Carthage shall be free.
XVII. A Conjecture when a Law must be enlarged.
XVIII. Of Tricks to evade a Law.
XIX. A Conjecture when the Law ought to be restrained upon the Account
of Some Defect in the Will of the Lawgiver.
XX. An Observation upon this Conjecture.
XXI. Or upon the Account of Some Accident inconsistent with his Will, as
where it is either unlawful,
XXII. Or too grievous in Respect of the Performance.
XXIII. What if two Laws are contrary one to another.
As the entries in the list above reveal, especially those following XI,
Pufendorf, like Grotius and Vattel, had a deep appreciation for hard cases.149
He devoted several pages to a discussion of what was meant by the terms of the
peace treaty that ended the Second Punic War (Rules XV and XVI), where the
Romans simultaneously obtained total control over the governance of Carthage
and promised that "Carthage should be a free City."' 50 Could the Romans
command the Carthaginians, by virtue of Rome's dominion, to tear down the
city of Carthage, even if the Romans could not themselves destroy it? 5'1
Pufendorf's resolution of this case places him in league with textualists,
revealing a sophisticated commitment to honoring word and sentence meaning.
Pufendorf examines this case and concludes that the Carthaginians could not be
instructed by the Romans to destroy Carthage because it was promised to them
that the city would remain free. Pufendorf contrasts the text "Carthage should
be a free City" with the test "the Carthaginians" "should be free." If the treaty
had said that the Carthaginians would remain free, rather than that Carthage
should be a free city, the Romans might have been able to order them to destroy
Carthage because the destruction of the city would not necessarily render them
unfree.152 This conclusion puts a great deal of faith in the power of words.
In addition to this example, Pufendorf also concludes that interpreters
should not provide for cases that were not originally contemplated, save where
the exclusion would merely be a semantic trick (Rule XVII).15 For example,
although Pufendorf famously (or infamously, as the case may be) stated that
meaning of words can be "enlarged" or "restricted" on occasion to meet the
needs of particular cases, such enlargements or restrictions should not be
149. These cases included those in which the terms of a treaty spoke vaguely or generally. See,
e.g., id. at 544-46.
150. Id. at 545 (emphasis omitted); see also George Anastaplo, The Constitution at Two
Hundred: Explorations, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 967, 979-84 (1991) (recounting the major events of the
Second Punic War).
151. PUFENDORF, supra note 21, at 545. Pufendorf concludes that the command was
"[p]erfidious[]." Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 545-46.
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"easily admitted" unless the words are "entirely dissonant to common use.",
154
He concludes that restrictions on plain language should be narrow, applied only
when certain that the case was not meant to fall within the rule's fair import
(Rules XIII-XXII).'" Most importantly of all, he emphasizes that one is not to
look to the law-giver or -enforcer for guidance, but to confine his inquiry to the
instrument itself.'56 Pufendorf's approach, like that of Grotius and Vattel, is
remarkably sophisticated, crossing nineteen pages and twenty-three rules,
examples, and cases.
4. Burlamaqui's The Principles of Natural and Politic Law
Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1694-1748) was a Swiss law professor and
legal and political theorist whose treatise The Principles of Natural and Politic
Law was first published in 1747. The work found instantaneous popularity.157
The Principles was generally available in an English translation as early as
1763.158
Burlamaqui's work stood shoulder-to-shoulder with those of other
continental publicists in the minds of early American lawyers and statesmen.
By 1780, The Principles was kept in important libraries from Philadelphia to
Boston.159 Harvard, Princeton (then the College of New Jersey), Brown (then
Rhode Island College), Dartmouth, Columbia (then King's College), Franklin
and Marshall, and William and Mary all used Burlamaqui's treatise as a
textbook before 1800, several before 1790.160 In 1793, Thaddeus M. Harris,
then Harvard's librarian, recommended Burlamaqui along with Blackstone as
an essential textbook for legal study. James Wilson, an important Framing
figure and eventual Supreme Court Justice, included references to Burlamaqui
in his 1790 lectures at the University of Pennsylvania-lectures attended by
"President George Washington and his Cabinet, the Governor, and Members of
Congress and of the Legislature." 62
Burlamaqui, like Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf, was a textualist, though
he comments on interpretation only briefly. Rather than devote a chapter to
interpretation, Burlamaqui discusses interpretation in the context of situations
often arising in international relations and thereby breaks up his discussion into
154. Id.
155. Seeid. at 547-49.
156. See id. at 534-35 (explaining the need for objective rules); id. at 539-42 (explaining that
meaning must be derived from the instrument itself).
157. HARVEY, supra note 62, at 185-87.
158. Thompson, supra note 112, at 526.
159. HARVEY, supra note 62, at 81-83.
160. Id. at 83-84. Several other universities used the textbook before 1810, including Williams
College, Hampden-Sydney, Union College, and Dickinson College. Id. at 84.
161. THADDEUS M. HARRIS, A SELECTED CATALOGUE OF THE MOST ESTEEMED PUBLICATIONS
IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, PROPER TO FORM A SOCIAL LIBRARY WITH AN INTRODUCTION UPON THE
CHOICE OF BOOKS (Boston, I. Thomas and E.T. Andrews 1793).
162. 1 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 172 (1908); see also 1
JAMES WILSON, WORKS 8 (Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press 1804) (noting that "General Washington, then
President of the United States, was present"); id. at 69 (citing Burlamaqui); I James Wilson, THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 118, 154 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (citing Burlamaqui).
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several chapters. Thus, in his volume on "Politic Law" Burlamaqui discusses
"public treaties in general" (Part IV, Chapter IX), and various compacts such as
those with an enemy and those that make a truce or a peace (Part IV, Chapters
X-XIV).1 While this means that many of Burlamaqui's recommendations are
linked to substantive principles drawn from agency law, the law of captures,
and war and peace, nevertheless, some general interpretive principles do come
to light upon close examination.
Motivating the need for objective interpretation with respect to promises
made between nations, Burlamaqui wrote:
[S]overeigns are no less obliged, than individuals, inviolably to keep their
word, and be faithful to their engagements. The law of nations renders this an
indispensable duty; for it is evident, that were it otherwise, not only public
treaties would be useless to states, but moreover, that the violation of these
would throw them into a state of diffidence and continual war; that is to say,
into the most terrible situation. . . . The royal word ought therefore to be
inviolable, and sacrediM
Burlamaqui explains what he means by "the royal word" only obliquely.
He never explicitly states that other materials or considerations cannot be
brought to bear on the interpretive inquiry, for instance. Nevertheless,
Burlamaqui provides some evidence that he believes "royal word" to mean
literally "words" in the treaty. He provides, for example, a few paragraphs
setting forth interpretive canons he finds worthy of particular emphasis,
pertaining to how parties should treat text in the treaty itself,165 accompanied
by a broad exhortation to "carefully attend to the rule of conventions in
general" in the interpretation of public treaties.166
Burlamaqui reveals his approach to more difficult interpretive questions
indirectly, for instance through his discussion of the obligation of adhering to a
treaty of truce and of peace even with a hated enemy.167 Here, he mentions a
disagreement he has with Pufendorf. Burlamaqui believed a truce "granted only
for burying the dead" could not, by way of its failure to include explicit
limiting terms, be used to "retire into a more secure post, nor entrench
ourselves . . . . [T]hough Pufendorf indeed, is of a contrary opinion."' But
163. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 22, at 314-59.
164. Id. at 315.
165. See, e.g., id. at 322-25. These are relatively minor and obvious to the modem ear, such as
"I. A treaty, concluded for a certain time, expires at the end of the term agreed on." Id. at 323. Whether
these rather banal rules had particular salience for Burlamaqui or he legitimately thought they were
especially worthy of careful attention is unclear.
166. Id. at 323. This has been taken by many to be an explicit invocation of the interpretive
rules set out by Grotius and Pufendorf, and some editions include explicit footnotes referencing the
pertinent chapters of these authors' works. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUEs BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL AND POLITIC LAw 523 n.8 (Peter Korkman ed., Liberty Fund 2006) (1752) ("These rules are
drawn from DGP I.15 §§14-15 and from DNG VIII.9 §11.")
167. See id. at 325-43.
168. Id. at 338. Pufendorf s willingness to tackle hard examples leaves many of his conclusions
vulnerable. See, e.g., PUFENDORF supra note 21, at 549 (describing a case in which Pufendorf would
consider it excusable to open the city gates to allow in allies in a time of war. Depending on the nature
of the prohibition, or the susceptibility of the gate's guards to deception, one could easily see that this
306
Treaty Textualism
this is a difficult interpretive question, one that has to do with notions of what a
text or agreement reasonably implies, that would probably divide fair-minded
textualists even today.
On the other hand, Burlamaqui found much to favor in Grotius and
Pufendorf. In addition to his earlier reference to both in his exaltation of their
interpretive systems as "the rule[s] of conventions in general," 69 Burlamaqui
refers to them again in saying that "several questions relating to safe conducts
may be decided, either by the nature of the privilege granted, or by the general
rules of right interpretation" by which he clearly, again, meant the rules laid
down by Pufendorf and Grotius.o70
Thus, Burlamaqui, to the extent he spoke of interpretation, explicitly
extended or incorporated the works of Grotius and Pufendorf, who had already
set forth nuanced textualist programs. A treaty interpreter in the late eighteenth
century would have found nothing in Burlamaqui to support a deviation from
Vattelian or Grotian textualism that proceeded in a step-wise fashion from
lesser to greater abstraction depending on the ambiguity in the instrument under
consideration.
5. Other Authorities (Blackstone, Lee, Bacon, Bynkershoek,
Rutherforth and Wolff)
At least a half-dozen other publicists were also important to treaty
interpretation at the founding, either directly or indirectly. 171 William
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, for instance, was known
to every American lawyer in the early republic and has long been considered
one of the most authoritative and influential legal texts in American history.172
Matthew Bacon's A New Abridgment of the Law appears dozens of times in
early American cases in both federal and state courts. Christian Wolff
(Wolfius), Cornelius van Bynkershoek, Richard Lee, and Thomas Rutherforth
were also extremely influential, their names appearing explicitly in early
Supreme Court treaty decisions. 173
Each could receive his own detailed treatment here, for each also included
an aside on interpretation, if not a thorough discussion. Blackstone's short
treatment-those famous four pages beginning "before I conclude this section,
it may not be amiss to add a few observations concerning the interpretation of
laws"-is plainly cribbed from Grotius (whom, to his credit, Blackstone cites
action falls well within the rule's prohibition).
169. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 22. at 323.
170. Id. at 340 (emphasis added). Once again, some editions of The Principles make this
reference to Grotius and Pufendorf explicit. See supra note 166 (citing one such edition).
171. Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81
YALE L.J. 672, 689 (1972).
172. Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1996).
173. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 231, 239 (1796) (citing Rutherforth along
with Bynkershoek, Lee, Burlamaqui and Vattel); id. at 230 (citing Wolfius); id. at 220, 226, 231, 243,
263 (citing Bynkershoek); id. at 231, 243 (citing Lee).
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extensively in the Commentaries).174 Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law-
which Justice Story would later "borrow almost in terms" in his own
interpretation chapter in the Commentaries on the Constitution 1-were
themselves just an English translation and commentary on Grotius, prepared
and delivered as lectures at Cambridge.176 Richard Lee's A Treatise on
Captures in War "was largely a popularization of the views of
Bynkershoek,"1 77 while Vattel's treatise on The Law of Nations was probably
better thought a translation and popularization of Wolfius than a work solely
his own.
In other words, Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui are especially
significant because they represent a sort of common denominator within a
community of authors who, between themselves, freely borrowed, adapted and
updated each other's ideas. 179 And in one essential respect there was profound
consensus. According to these authors-and, at least as far as Burlamaqui was
concerned, according to the law of nations itselfI80-the proper approach to
treaty interpretation was to interpret through a procession of abstraction. Clear
text ended the inquiry. If the text was not clear, the next step was to look at to
the common usage of the terms together, then their reasonable import, then
finally, if necessary, context, subject matter, consequences, and purposes.
Not one authority counseled looking beyond the text, and several
counseled explicitly against such detours. 81 Blackstone in his capsule
treatment on interpretation in the Commentaries wrote:
When any doubt arose upon the construction of the Roman laws, the usage was
to state the case to the emperor in writing, and take his opinion upon it. This
was certainly a bad method of interpretation. To interrogate the legislature to
174. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *58-61 (citing both Pufendorf and Grotius by name in the
text and distilling the same interpretive system originally set forth by Grotius that was then copied by
Pufendorf and borrowed by Vattel, among others).
175. See STORY, supra note 121, at 285 n. I ("The foregoing remarks are borrowed almost in
terms from Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law (B. 2, ch. 7, § 4 to 11), which contain a very lucid
exposition of the general rules of interpretation. The whole chapter deserves an attentive perusal.").
176. See THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW: BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF A
COURSE OF LECTURES ON GROTIus DE JuRE BELLI ET PACts READ IN S. JOHNS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
(Cambridge, J. Bentham 1756).
177. Lofgren, supra note 171, at 689; see also HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL
COURT: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1775-1787, at 181
(1977) (claiming Lee "largely parroted" the opinions of Bynkershoek).
178. See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: 1, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 227
(1945) (calling him a "popularizer of the work of an earlier German writer, Christian Wolff'); Gerald L.
Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 922 (1991) (calling Vattel a disciple of Wolff);
Quincy Wright, Toward A Universal Law for Mankind, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 439 (1963) (noting that
"Emerich Vattel attempted to translate the rather difficult Latin of Wolff into readable French").
179. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *58-64 (citing Pufendorf and Grotius);
Richardson, supra note 72, at 550 (noting Vattel "copied most of the formal rules he could cull from the
treaties of his era" and "[w]ith some liberal borrowing" from Christian Wolff).
180. BURLAMAQUI, supra note 22, at 322-25, 340 (calling them "the rules of right
interpretation," or "the rules of conventions in general," respectively).
181. The no recourse rule was among, for example, Francis Bacon's maxims. See FRANCIS
BACON, Containing a Collection of Some Principal Rules and Maxims of the Common Law, in THE
ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWES OF ENGLAND 1, 92 (London, John Moore Esq. 1630).
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decide particular disputes, is not only endless, but affords great room for
partiality and oppression.' 82
A point Rutherforth also made in his Institutes, writing:
[T]he obligations that are produced by the civil laws of our country, arise from
the intention of the legislator; not merely as this intention is an act of the mind;
but as it is declared or expressed by some outward sign or mark which makes it
known to us .... The collecting of a man's intention from such signs or marks
is called interpretation.'13
While the views of these authorities could be set forth in more exhaustive
detail, a more fruitful inquiry might instead be to ask not what these authors
thought but whether this consensus among these authorities influenced the
understanding of treaty interpretation among the Framers and in the early
American courts. Did the Framers see the Grotian-Vattelian-Pufendorfian-
Burlamaquian-Rutherforthian-Blackstonian requirement that instruments be
interpreted according to their words alone as inherent in the definition of the
word "treaty"? Did they perhaps only have in mind the more general Grotian-
and-Vattelian prescription that whatever rules there may be, that they be
"certain" (i.e. fixed and definite)?' The following Section takes up these
questions.
C. Intepretation as a Distinctive Concern in the Framing and
Ratification
The following section makes explicit what might otherwise be merely
implicit-that these authorities and their particular interpretive approach
profoundly shaped the design of the U.S. Constitution, and, in particular, the
delegation to the Judiciary the power to construe the nation's treaty
commitments. It explains the great importance the founding generation placed
on enacting a written constitution, a priority that derived from the very legal
and jurisprudential context that shaped the founding generation's commitment
to textualism itself.
1. The Radicalism of a Written Constitution
The decision to set down written constitutions as compacts between "the
People" was a major American innovation. 18 Prior to the revolution,
arguments over the existence and authority of the ancient British constitution
incorporated documents like colonial charters, the 1688 Bill of Rights, and the
Magna Carta merely as evidence of its content.' 86 But the British constitution
182. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *58.
183. RUTHERFORTH, supra note 176, at 307-08.
184. VATTEL, supra note 23, at 246 (arguing that interpretation should proceed according to
rules that are "certain").
185. Baade, supra note 37, at 1013; see WOOD, supra note 62, at 291-95.
186. WOOD, supra note 62, at 259-73.
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was ultimately ineffable-it resided in a collection of written and unwritten
rules and conventions embodied in no single authoritative text. 187 This
approach to constitutionalism infused British legal culture. In the eighteenth-
century British legal system, where much law-even fundamental law-was
unwritten, semantic interpretation often stood beside, or even beneath, moral
and political arguments justifying a written law in the face of the asserted
existence of a superior unwritten law. 88
The notion that the fundamental laws of the states and the federal
government would hereafter be written imported into American legal thought a
novel and enormous preoccupation with interpretation.189 Thomas Paine wrote
glowingly in 1794 of the Constitution as America's "political bible":
Scarcely a family was without it. Every member of the Government had a copy;
and nothing was more common when any debate arose on the principle of a
bill, or on the extent of any species of authority, than for the members to take
the printed Constitution out of their pocket, and read the chapter with which
such matter in debate was connected.19
But the very notion that written text could be limiting in this way-and
therefore worth thrusting into debates over the Constitution's meaning in the
manner Paine describes-presupposes that on some grave interpretive
questions it was thought that there was no difference to be split; that when the
Constitution said one thing it could not mean another, and that the way of
deciding was semantic, not moral or political. 191
This idea, that text mattered enormously, is evident from the Framers'
and ratifiers' obsession with words. In the Constitutional Convention, dozens of
proposals were struck or modified for vagueness, ambiguity or indefiniteness.
"On the proposition for giving 'Legislative power in all cases to which the
State Legislatures were individually incompetent,"' Charles Pinckney and John
Rutledge "objected to the vagueness of the term incompetent, and said they
could not well decide how to vote until they should see an exact enumeration of
187. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *85; EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1642), reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 745, 750 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003); A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (9th ed. 1959).
188. For a thoughtful discussion, see WOOD, supra note 62, at 265-67; Edward S. Corwin, The
"Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 170 (1928);
Manning, supra note 36, at 22-56.
189. Powell, supra note 37, at 892-94.
190. 2 THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 28 (4th Am. ed. 1794), reprinted in THE LIFE AND
MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 345, 378 (Philip S. Fonder ed., 1945). Cf THOMAS PAINE,
COMMON SENSE (1776) ("[I]n America the law is King.").
191. But see Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115
Hary. L. Rev. 4, 45-46 (2001) (arguing that "[c]ontrary to a common misperception among present-day
constitutional lawyers" the American founders "did not believe that putting a constitution into writing
altered its fundamental character" and that, as such enacting written constitutions had a limited impact
on the methods of constitutional reasoning and constitutional argument already used in interpreting the
English constitution). Kramer's conclusion seems open to question. See WOOD, supra note 62, at 259-
305; Baade, supra note 37, at 1014-24.
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the powers comprehended by this definition." 92 In response to Pinckney's
motion "that the National Legislature should have authority to negative all
Laws which they should judge to be improper,"' 93 John Dickinson replied it
was "impossible to draw a line between the cases proper & improper for the
exercise of the negative."'194 The list of such scuffles was long,195 pervading
the subsequent ratifying conventions with equal vigor.196
Objections to the Constitution's capacious terms, and the interpretive
space they opened, only grew more cataclysmic in the ratification period.
Edmund Randolph, the delegate to the Constitutional Convention who
proposed the Virginia Plan and played an influential role in drafting the final
constitutional text as a member of the Committee of Detail,' 97 refused to sign it
because he thought its language too vague and manipulable-and published a
widely-read pamphlet saying so.'98 Elbridge Gerry, another delegate turned
dissident, did and said the same.199 By the "undefined meaning of some parts,"
wrote Gerry, "and the ambiguities of expression in others . . . [the Constitution
is] dangerously adapted to the purposes of an immediate aristocratic tyranny. .
[and] uncontrouled despotism."200
But it was "[a] series of essays published in the New York Journal from
October 1787 through April 1788 under the byline 'Brutus' [that] constituted
by far the most powerful and sustained attack on the Constitution from an anti-
hermeneutical perspective."201 Brutus was a powerful intellectual force, and a
sharp essayist, and it has been argued that the power of his objections impelled
Hamilton to author Federalist Nos. 78 and 81.202 Wrote Brutus:
192. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 191, at 53 (May 31, 1787); see also 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1789, at 17 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (July 16, 1787) [hereinafter 2
FARRAND'S RECORDs] (reiterating the objection).
193. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 164 (June 8, 1787).
194. Id. at 167 (June 8, 1787).
195. Objections were raised to the precision of the words "giving aid and comfort" to the
enemy, 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 192, at 345-47 (Aug. 20, 1787), "disability" as a ground for
impeachment and removal, id. at 427 (Aug. 27, 1787), whether the power to define and punish
"felonies" on the high seas was unacceptably vague, id. at 315-16 (Aug. 17, 1787), and whether
Congress needed the powers to both define and punish such crimes, or whether the words "and
punish[]" were superfluous, id. at 315. There are several more. See, e.g., id. at 276 (Aug. 13, 1787)
(noting that the word "revenue" is "ambiguous"); id. at 301-02, 304-05 (Aug. 15-16, 1787) (raising a
concern that "bills" would not read to include "resolutions" and "votes"); id. at 348-49 (Aug. 20, 1787)
(emphasizing the importance of placing the word "sole" before "power").
196. See, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler, Twins Separated at Birth: A Comparative History of the Civil
and Criminal Arising Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and Some Proposals for Change, 19 VT.
L. REV. 673, 685 & n.56 (1995) (listing in extraordinary detail the recurrent objections to the vagueness
of "arising under" jurisdiction appearing throughout ratifying conventions and pamphlets).
197. John C. Hueston, Altering the Course of the Constitutional Convention: The Role of the
Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and Federal Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 765, 776
(1990) (describing Randolph's role in pressing for express enumerations of the federal powers).
198. Letter on the Federal Constitution from Edmund Randolph to the Virginia
Legislature (Oct. 16, 1787), in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 1787-1788,
at 264-65 (P. Ford ed., 1888) [hereinafter PAMPHLETS].
199. Elbridge Gerry, Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State
Conventions By a Columbian Patriot (1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS, supra note 198, at 9.
200. Id. at 6.
201. Powell, supra note 37, at 907.
202. Robert J. Reinstein & Mark C. Rahdert, Reconstructing Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV. 729,
2014] 311
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 39: 283
2d. The judicial are not only to decide questions arising upon the meaning of
the constitution in law, but also in equity.
By this they are empowered, to explain the constitution according to the
reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter.
From this method of interpreting laws (says Blackstone) by the reason of them,
arises what we call equity; which is thus defined by Grotius, "the correction of
that, wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient["]; for since in
laws all cases cannot be foreseen, or expressed, it is necessary, that when the
decrees of the law cannot be applied to particular cases, there should some
where be a power vested of defining those circumstances, which had they been
foreseen the legislator would have expressed; and these are the cases, which
according to Grotius, ["Ilex non exacte definit, sed arbitrio boni viri permittet."
They will give the sense of every article of the constitution that may from time
to time come before them. And in their decisions they will not confine
themselves to any fixed or established rules, but will determine, according to
what appears to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution.203
Four points are immediately worth making about the passage above-a passage
that prompted some of the most famous lines in Federalist Nos. 78 and 81.
First, Brutus, among the Constitution's most merciless and intelligent
opponents, 204 saw Blackstone and Grotius as authorities on the proper methods
of interpretation. Second, he invoked them because he believed that his
audience-those who were set to vote on the Constitution's text-agreed that
Grotius and Blackstone were interpretive authorities whose methods were
likely to be applied by judges. He sought to use the Federalists' own authorities
against them. Third, Brutus's description of Blackstone and Grotius's
interpretive methods is almost laughably unfair.20 5 As set out in the earlier
sections explaining the interpretive methods of Grotius and Blackstone, they
thought of text as the very centerpiece of interpretation.206 Or as Hamilton
bristled in Federalist No. 83, "equity is to give relief IN EXTRAORDINARY
CASES, which are EXCEPTIONS to general rules."207 Fourth, given Hamilton's
strenuous denial that judges would possess much interpretative discretion, it
816 (2005).
203. Brutus Essay No. 11 (Jan. 31, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
417, 419-20 (Herbert Storing ed., 1981).
204. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James Wilson, and
the Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New Federal
Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 113, 137 (2003).
205. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling
Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 30 (2000)
(collecting authorities who agree that Brutus's is an "exaggerated" reading of Grotius and Blackstone).
206. See supra Subsections I.B.2 and II.B.5.
207. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Note
that this emphasis is Hamilton's. He explained further in a footnote that "[iut is true that the principles by
which that relief is governed are now reduced to a regular system; but it is not the less true that they are
in the main applicable to SPECIAL circumstances, which form exceptions to general rules." Id.
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would seem that one profound source of common ground for Federalists and
Anti-Federalists alike was that judges would not substitute their "WILL" for
"JUDGMENT" and that interpretation would be constrained and limited.208
2. The Framers' Confidence in Judicial Expertise and Integrity
as a Restraint on Discretion
As remarkable as Brutus's denigration of Grotius and Blackstone's
textualism is and was, perhaps equally remarkable was the certainty among the
Constitution's advocates that judicial decisions really would be text-bound.
Time and again, as skeptics argued that judges would interpret the law
according to their politics, constitutional advocates responded that text would
rein them in. At the Constitutional Convention, in response to a motion to allow
judges to participate in the revision of laws, it was objected that "j]udges ought
not to be subject to the bias which a participation in the making of laws might
give in the exposition of them." 209 Madison replied:
[This objection] had some weight; but it was much diminished by reflecting
that . .. a small part of [the laws coming before a council Judge] ... would be
so ambiguous as to leave room for his prepossessions; and that but a few cases
[would] probably arise in the life of a Judge under such ambiguous passages.
How much good on the other hand would proceed from the perspicuity, the
conciseness, and the systematic character [which] the Code of laws [would]
receive from the Judiciary talents.2 10
In the mad pamphleteering that followed the Convention prior to the
ratification, Alexander Contee Hanson responded to charges that the
Constitution's "sweeping clause"-the clause that allows Congress to make all
laws "necessary and proper" to the effectuation of its enumerated powers-
would "afford pretext, for freeing congress from all constitutional restraints." 211
Wrote Hanson:
Consider the import of the words.
I take the construction of these words to be precisely the same, as if the clause
had preceded further and said, "No act of congress shall be valid, unless it have
relation to the foregoing powers, and be necessary and proper for carrying them
208. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also id. at 471 (arguing that "[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in
every particular case").
209. 1 FARRAND's RECORDS, supra note 2, at 138 (June 6, 1787); 2 FARRAND's RECORDS,
supra note 192, at 79-80 (July 21, 1787) ("Mr. Wilson. The proposition is certainly not liable to all the
objections which have been urged agst. It. According to (Mr. Gerry) it will unite the Executive &
Judiciary in an offensive & defensive alliance agst. The Legislature .. . To the .. .objection stated . .. it
might be answered that supposing the prepossession to mix itself with the exposition, the evil would be
overbalanced by the advantages promised by the expedient.").
210. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 138-39.
211. Alexander Contee Hanson, Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a Federal Government by
Aristides, reprinted in PAMPHLETS, supra note 198, at 218, 233.
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into execution." 212
Later in the essay, he repeated this even more emphatically:
[W]hen the compact ascertains and defines the power delegated to the federal
head, then cannot this government, without manifest usurpation, exert any
power not expressly, or by necessary implication, conferred by the compact.
This doctrine is so obvious and plain, that I am amazed any good man should
deplore the omission of a bill of rights.2 13
And in refuting Brutus's charges in Federalist Nos. 78 and 81, Hamilton
responded with overwhelming force. He argued that judges who misbehaved
would be removed by impeachment. 214 He argued that the whole branch could
be subdued if other branches ignored its judgments.215 This famously made the
judiciary the "least dangerous" branch, one whose claim to authority stemmed
216from its reason not its power. Most importantly for present purposes, he
argued that judges would engage in interpretation of a distinctly legal and
legitimate character. Courts are "bound down by strict rules and precedents
which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them," he wrote.217 This demanded:
[L]ong and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge ... . [T]here can
be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to
qualify them for the stations of judges. And ... the number must be still smaller
of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge. 218
This claim, that judges would need to be, and would be, men of unusual
expertise and integrity, learned in ways of a distinctive legal method, not only
appeared and reappeared in the section on the judiciary in The Federalist
Papers but also in the debates over the Constitution's design in the
Constitutional Convention.219
The need for interpretation founded on knowledge and integrity was a
212. Id. at 234.
213. Id. at 242 (emphasis omitted).
214. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
215. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 484-85 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
216. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
217. Id. at 471.
218. Id.
219. For such invocations in The Federalist Papers, see id.; THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 483,
491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); and THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 504 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For invocations in the Constitutional Convention see, for
example, 1 FARRAND'S REcORDS, supra note 2, at 138-39 (June 6, 1787) (Madison describing
"Judiciary talents"); 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 192, at 73-74 (July 21, 1787) (quoting Mr.
Elseworth as arguing that "[t]he aid of the Judges will give more wisdom & firmness to the Executive.
They will possess a systematic and accurate knowledge of the Laws, which the Executive can not be
expected always to possess. The law of Nations also will frequently come into question. Of this the
Judges alone will have competent information"); and id. at 429 (Aug. 27, 1787) (quoting General
Pickney as arguing that the "the Judiciary will require men of the fust talents").
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distinct and important concern for those who framed and ratified the
Constitution. The authorities on interpretation were-as Brutus himself pointed
out-Grotius and his enthusiasts (e.g., Blackstone). That these systems were
seen, as Hamilton explains in Federalist No. 78, as "strict rules" 220 that "bound
down" 221 judges was, as Hanson explained, "obvious and plain." 222 The
Constitution's advocates, in other words, placed their faith in an idea that
interpretation could be predictable, rational, and textual.
3. International Trust Through Judicial Treaty Interpretation
As lofty discussions of constitutional interpretation beat on velivolant,
arguments over stability and uniformity in treaty interpretation floated in their
wake. The need, reiterated repeatedly, was to create a nation other nations
could trust to keep its promises.223 This could only be done if the judiciary was
required to interpret treaties as they would laws and thereby give them uniform
nationwide effect.
At the Constitutional Convention these themes emerged in far-reaching
deliberations over where to vest treaty-making and treaty-enforcement powers.
When presenting the Virginia Plan in the Convention's opening weeks,
Edmund Randolph, not wishing to bog the Convention down in particularities
early, thought that all could agree that the scope of federal court jurisdiction
should be broad enough to protect "the security of foreigners where treaties are
in their favor, and to preserve the harmony of states and that of the citizens
thereof."224 This was "[a]greed to unanimously."225 Six days later Madison
savaged the New Jersey Plan for its weak judiciary's inability to "prevent those
violations of the law of nations & of Treaties which if not prevented must
involve us in the calamities of foreign wars" even though "the tendency of the
States to these violations has been manifested in sundry instances." 226
The reasons the Framers thought the judiciary the unanimous choice to
protect against violations were twofold: judges would be independent and they
would be expert. These qualities were considered by members of the
convention to be vital to obtaining the trust of other nations because they would
ensure that treaty interpretation would be faithful to the commitment made in
the instrument itself.
Discussion of independence as an essential ingredient of good faith in
international commitments arose in discussions of term length for members of
the legislature. James Wilson argued on June 26 that because the Senate would
probably be the repository of the treaty-making power:
It ought therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign nations. The
220. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
221. Id.
222. Hanson, supra note 211, at 218, 242.
223. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 31, at 934.
224. 1 FARRAND's REcoRDs, supra note 2, at 238 (June 13, 1787).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 316 (June 19, 1787).
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true reason why Britain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty with us has
been, because she had no confidence in the stability or efficacy of our
Government. 9 years with a rotation, will provide these desirable qualities ...
227
Wilson would repeat the point later that day:
What is the reason that Great Britain does not enter into a commercial treaty
with us? Because congress has not the power to enforce its observance. But
give them those powers, and give them the stability [of nine year terms] ... and
they will have more permanency than a monarchical government? 8
The idea that long service would ensure fidelity to treaties was further
amplified later by Gouverneur Morris. Explaining why he thought the Senate
should have life terms a few days later, he argued:
4. An independence for life, involves the necessary permanency. If we change
our measures no body will trust us: and how avoid a change of measures, but by
avoiding a change of men. Ask any man if he confides in Congs. if he confides
in <the State of> Pena. if he will lend his money or enter into contract? He will
tell you no. He sees no stability. He can repose no confidence. If G. B. were to
explain her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning would be employed.229
Discussion, meanwhile, of expertise as essential to ensuring that the
United States would respect the law of nations arose in discussions of the role
the judiciary might play in revising and enforcing the laws. Oliver Ellsworth
argued as part of a valiant motion to reconsider creating a Council of Revision
that:
The aid of the Judges will give more wisdom & firmness to the Executive.
They will possess a systematic and accurate knowledge of the Laws, which the
Executive can not be expected always to possess. The law of Nations also will
frequently come into question. Of this the Judges alone will have competent
information.230
These sentiments, which echoed Madison's own exhortation that the nation
would benefit from "Judiciary talents"231 by means of such a council, found
renewed support from James Wilson alongside George Mason who further
remarked: "[the judges'] aid will be the more valuable as they are in the habit
and practice of considering laws in their true principles, and in all their
consequences." 232
Ultimately, the choice of the Convention was as elegant as it was
deliberate. Article III would vest federal courts with jurisdiction over all cases
227. Id. at 426 (June 26, 1787).
228. Id. at 433 (June 26, 1787).
229. Id. at 513 (July 2, 1787).
230. 2 FARRAND's RECORDS, supra note 192, at 73-74 (July 21, 1787).
231. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 138-39 (June 6, 1787).
232. 2 FARRAND's RECORDS, supra note 192, at 78 (July 21, 1787).
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arising under "this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;" 233 while Article VI
would proclaim as supreme law "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States . . . and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States." 234 As Professor Akhil Amar has elsewhere
observed, "Even though one clause appears in Article III and the other in
faraway Article VI, intratextual analysis suggests that they were indeed
designed to be read together, as interlocking parts of a coherent whole ....
The records of the Philadelphia Convention reveal this to be so. 236
Giving the federal courts treaty jurisdiction, while simultaneously making
treaties national laws, resolved a deep tension between three rival concerns: the
need to ensure that States would cease placing the nation in breach of its treaty
commitments; the need to ensure against the possibility that a recalcitrant
Congress might refuse to execute a treaty already signed; and the need to
ensure that treaty interpretation would not be the self-serving work of a
237parochial executive branch. As Madison explained on the Convention floor:
There was an analogy between the Executive & Judiciary departments in
several respects. The latter executed the laws in certain cases as the former did
in others. The former expounded & applied them for certain purposes, as the
latter did for others. The difference between them seemed to consist chiefly in
two circumstances-1. the collective interest & security were much more in the
power belonging to the Executive than to the Judiciary department. 2. in the
administration of the former much greater latitude is left to opinion and
discretion than in the administration of the latter.238
The concerns of the Convention converged, in other words, on the need to
obtain international trust, while simultaneously obtaining national uniformity
and enforcement. The judiciary with its "[lesser] latitude . . . and discretion"
239was the natural repository of this awesome task.
And in the face of blistering Antifederalist opposition, the Constitution's
advocates stood by these convictions.240 John Jay wrote in Federalist No. 3
that by vesting treaty interpretation in the federal judiciary, "treaties and
articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in
one sense and executed in the same manner." 24 1 He pressed the argument
233. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
234. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
235. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 766 (1999).
236. See 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 192, at 430-31 (Aug. 21, 1787) (rewording the
Supremacy Clause to render it "conformabl[e]" to wording of the federal question jurisdiction clause).
237. Further evidence of this from within just the Constitutional Convention itself can be
adduced. For detailed accounts see, for example, Martin S. Flaherty, History Right? Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties As "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REv.
2095, 2123-24 (1999); and Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARv. L.
REv. 1867, 1918 (2005).
238. 2 FARRAND'S RECoRDs, supra note 192, at 34 (July 17, 1787).
239. Id.
240. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 31, at 995-1000 & nn.265-87.
241. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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further in Federalist No. 64.242 Throughout, Jay emphasized that "the affairs of
trade and navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and
steadily pursued; and that both our treaties and our laws should correspond with
and be made to promote it."243 Responding to those who "insist[ed], and
profess[ed] to believe, that treaties . . . should be repealable at pleasure," Jay
replied that by vesting treaty interpretation in the judiciary other nations would
know they could trust that such treaties would be binding against the United
States.244 This was an understanding shared, and widely enunciated other
influential Federalists. 24 5 In response to a letter by George Mason -who
ultimately refused to sign the Constitution, and led the opposition to its
ratification in the Virginia Convention-James Iredell replied:
Did not Congress very lately unanimously resolve, in adopting the very sensible
letter of Mr. Jay, 247 that a treaty when once made pursuant to the sovereign
authority, ex vi termini became immediately the law of the land? . . . If it was
not, what foreign power would trust us? 248
This notion of the need for international trust and acceptance was, in other
words, an important consideration-some have argued a primary
consideration 249-in the design of the Constitution itself.
The crucial leap is this: for the Framers to have thought that the decision
to invest treaty interpretation in the judiciary would work as a pre-commitment
strategy, they must have believed that judges could be trusted to properly
construe them. The Framers and ratifiers must have understood that American
federal judges would construe treaties not only in a regular, predictable manner,
but also that their methods of interpretation would be of a kind acceptable to
the fledgling nation's European counterparts.
242. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 390-94 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
243. Id. at 392.
244. Id. at 394.
245. Alexander Hamilton, for example, makes all of the same points, in the same order, at
considerable length and with considerable clarity, in Federalist No. 22. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at
150-51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 108-09
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
246. George Mason, Objections to the Federal Constitution, reprinted in PAMPHLETS, supra
note 198, at 327.
247. Iredell is referring to a very influential letter by John Jay. See John Jay, An Address to the
People of the State of New York, on the Subject of the Constitution. Agreed Upon at Philadelphia, the
17th of September, 1787. By a Citizen of New York, in PAMPHLETS, supra note 198, at 67. George
Washington commented on the Jay Letter: "The good sense, forcible observations, temper and
moderation with which the pamphlet is written, cannot fail, I should think, of making a serious
impression upon the antifederal mind, where it is not under the influence of such local views as will
yield to no argument, no proof." Id. S. B. Webb and Noah Webster made similar contemporaneous
remarks. Id.
248. James Iredell, Observations on George Mason's Objections to the New Constitution,
Recommended by the Late Convention. By Marcus, reprinted in PAMPHLETS, supra note 198, at 333,
355. The pamphlet was originally published in the State Gazette ofNorth Carolina, and was republished
in pamphlet form, together with pieces by Archibald Maclaine and William R. Davie. The original
pamphlet has itself been lost, but this section reflects putative excerpts from J.G. McRee's Life ofJames
Iredell (1858), "a work of considerable rarity; and in consequence the above title is certainly not that of
the pamphlet." Id. at 333.
249. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 31.
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The most powerful evidence of this view is that John Jay observed that
this was precisely the point and purpose of investing treaty interpretation in the
Courts, in exactly these words, in a letter to the Continental Congress in 1787
while serving as the new republic's Secretary of Foreign Affairs under the
Articles of Confederation. Jay, who had been the young nation's chief treaty
negotiator in securing the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, rendered for
the Continental Congress a letter, meant for distribution to the individual states,
instructing them that their legislatures possessed no power to pass laws
interfering with the manifest purposes of the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great
Britain. Wrote Jay:
All doubts ... respecting the meaning of a treaty ... are to be heard and
decided in the courts of justice having cognizance of the causes in which they
arise, and whose duty it is to determine them according to the rules and maxims
established by the laws of nations for the interpretation of treaties.250
And so we come full circle in observing that in the year leading up to the
Constitutional Convention it was twice repeated by John Jay to the members of
the Continental Congress-a fair contingent of whom would later attend the
Convention and draft its Constitution-that there was an international
understanding of the proper methods of treaty interpretation. In vesting treaty
interpretation in the judiciary, the Framers sought to leverage this international
law of treaty interpretation as a tool to convince other more established nations
that it would be capable of making binding promises.
4. How Treaty Textualism Influences the Self-Execution Debate
There is an important point that can be derived from the foregoing
materials, and it is one that is nuanced enough, but also important enough, to be
worth addressing specifically. These materials show that there is subtle
distinction between "self-execution" and "presumptive self-execution." The
foregoing historical materials reveal that the original understanding was that if
a treaty was meant to be domestically enforceable federal law, it would be
domestically enforceable federal law. To that extent treaties are obviously
"self-executing." But nothing in these materials suggests that these instruments
would be presumed to be law.251 If the bargain called for legal effect, the treaty
would be domestic law. If it did not, it would not. This conclusion deviates
from what appears to be a consensus view among legal scholars that self-
execution was originally meant to be presumed unless a treaty explicitly
disclaimed it. That is, ambiguity meant self-execution. For instance, Professor
Martin Flaherty looks at all the materials presented here, but he argues these
materials point toward a doctrine of presumptive treaty self-execution. Quoting
250. 4 SECRET JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 205. Jay reiterated his understanding
in identical terms again in March 1787. Id. at 332.
251. On this point, Professor Yoo is indisputably correct. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 43, at
2056-57.
2014] 319
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 39: 283
the precise passage from Federalist No. 64 set out above,2 52 Flaherty argues
that "[t]hese and other statements make clear that the [Constitutional]
Convention's understanding that treaties would be presumptively self-
executing extended into the ratification process." 253 If by "presumptively self-
executing" Flaherty simply means that a treaty would be a binding international
commitment to which the United States, as a nation, could be held accountable
in federal court, then his position is incontestable. But Flaherty seems to imply
more than this. He seems to be saying that if a treaty was vague or ambiguous
with respect to the precise nature of its domestic effect, it should be
"presume[d]" to be domestic law.254 Professor Carlos Vdzquez is even more
emphatic that the Supremacy Clause created a "presumption" that treaties
would be judicially enforceable domestic law. 25 5
But not a single Framer said anything about interpretive presumptions of
self-execution. The Framers speak, rather, only of the enablement of self-
execution. That is, where a treaty contemplates or demands self-execution, it is
certainly a federal law. But, in terms of the founding materials, a
"presumption" of self-execution is suspiciously absent. Neither Vdzquez nor
Flaherty produce any statements, writings, correspondences, or other sources
that say that treaties were domestic law in instances in which their intended
domestic legal effect was ambiguous. The founding materials instead seem to
indicate that treaties were no more thought "presumptively" self-executing, as
an interpretive matter, than ambiguous federal statutes are "presumed" to create
a federal cause of action today.256
This result arises because the Framers did not intend for treaties to be
interpreted liberally, or narrowly, but textually. As such, there simply was no
presumption one way or the other.257 A treaty would be determined to be
enforceable on the basis of its text, structure, subject matter, context, purposes,
and consequences. Without an indication one way or the other, however, a
federal court would enforce a treaty if it were the kind of treaty that called for
such enforcement, not employ a one-size-fits-all presumption. This was the
approach the Court took in Foster v. Neilson, and, at the end of their articles it
seems both Flaherty 258 and Vizquez 259 relent and embrace it too.
252. See supra text accompanying note 244.
253. Flaherty, supra note 237, at 2129.
254. See id. at 2152.
255. See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 695, 710 (1995).
256. Cf Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a
treaty is "self-executing" and hence judicially enforceable only if it creates a private right of action).
257. See infra Section III.D.
258. Flaherty, supra note 233, at 2152 ("[W]hat can be said is that the original understanding of
the treaty power comports perfectly well with the traditional understanding of Foster [v. Neilson].
Treaties may be judicially enforced as the law of the land without further action by the House. Treaties
in which the sovereigns agree to take further affirmative action to implement their terms will require
legislation taking such steps.").
259. See VAzquez, supra note 255, at 722-23 ("First, a treaty might be judicially unenforceable
because the parties (or perhaps the U.S. treaty makers unilaterally) made it judicially unenforceable.
This is primarily a matter of intent.").
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D. Treaty Textualism in the Founding Era
The most powerful evidence that textualism was the understood method
of treaty interpretation at the founding comes from the practice of the courts at
the time. Courts deciding treaty cases both before and after the enactment of the
Constitution employed treaty textualism, a fact made plain not only from the
reasoning of the cases but also from their citations to authority. Alongside
citations for the substance of the law of nations in Vattel, Grotius and other
sources, the courts freely cited these authors' interpretive rules to decide
important issues in treaty interpretation cases.
The following sections explain how courts deciding cases under the
Articles of Confederation and, later, the Supreme Court, interpreted treaties.
Their highly textualist approaches would seem to indicate that the original
method of treaty interpretation was a textualism almost indistinguishable from
that used by textualists today.
1. Treaty Interpretation Under the Articles of Confederation
In 1777 thirteen States still at war with Great Britain joined together in
"Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union," 260 delegating to the
Continental Congress the authority to "enter[] upon treaties and alliances" on
their behalf, so long as its commercial treaties did not trammel their rights to
regulate certain imposts, duties, imports, and exports.261
Without courts of its own, the Continental Congress relied on state courts
to adjudicate foreign affairs cases-including treaty cases-with the possibility
of limited recourse to a Congressional "Committee on Appeals" (1775-1780)
and later a national Court of Appeals for Prize Cases (1780-1787).262 After the
adoption of the Constitution, state courts kept concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal courts, but all cases in which one of the parties thought a state court's
decision to be "against the title, right, privilege or exemption [provided by a
treaty]" would be appealable, ultimately, to the Supreme Court.263
Records of cases from the pre-Constitutional era are scarce.26 Not only
are there no reported cases, there appears to be no extant record of cases heard
260. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781. Although the Articles were not ratified by all the
States until 1781, a final version of the Articles was sent to the States for ratification in November 1777.
Eric M. Freedman, Why Constitutional Lawyers and Historians Should Take a Fresh Look at the
Emergence of the Constitution from the Confederation Period: The Case of the Drafting of the Articles
of Confederation, 60 TENN. L. REV. 783, 801 (1993).
261. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
262. See Alex Glashausser, The Extension Clause and the Supreme Court's Jurisdictional
Independence, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1225, 1229-30 (2012); Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 31, at 1001;
James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality ofJurisdiction-
Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 191, 207-08 (2007); Franklyn C. Setaro, The Formative Era
ofAmerican Admiralty Law, 5 N.Y.L.F. 9, 33-35 (1959).
263. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1257 (2006)); see also Paul Taylor, Congress's Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First
Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today's Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 847,
861-64 (2010) (describing the practical operation of the Judiciary Act of 1789).
264. See Setaro, supra note 262, at 33.
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by the Committee on Appeals prior to September 9, 1776. In 1889, on the
Supreme Court's one-hundredth anniversary, J.C. Bancroft Davis, then the
Supreme Court reporter, compiled a comprehensive account of all materials
respecting the work of the Continental Congress's Committee on Appeals and
the Court of Appeals for Prize Cases.265 The Committee on Appeals was
staffed by many men who would later frame the Constitution or play prominent
roles in the early republic. Its members included, at various points, James
Wilson, Samuel Chase, Roger Sherman, John Adams, and Edmund
266Randolph. And Pennsylvania's refusal to enforce the Committee of
Appeals' judgment in a case concerning the sloop Active is thought to have had
a formative effect on the thinking of the members of the Continental Congress
when they later designed the federal court system.267
Yet, so far as Davis could find, no written reports in the nature of
opinions were made by the Committee of Appeals, while the Court of Appeals
filed only eight. When in the summer of 1946 the Supreme Court requested and
obtained the help of the National Archives to reassess and preserve these
materials, Davis's conclusions were affirmed to be a comprehensive account of
the work of the Committee and the Court.268 Moreover, as the Court of
Appeals for Prize Cases was a court of appeals with limited jurisdiction to
adjudicate disputes over prizes, which are incidents to armed conflict,269 its
docket shrank steadily over the years following the Revolution,270 and its
decisions in treaty cases were limited to instances in which prize decisions
implicated a treaty (as opposed to the law of nations or admiralty
simpliciter).271 Thus, not much remains of pre-constitutional foreign affairs
cases, and of treaty cases even less survives.
265. J.C. BANCROFT DAVIS, APPENDIX TO THE REPORTS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM SEPT. 24, 1879, TO THE END OF THE OCTOBER TERM, 1888, AT 131
U.S. app. i, i-xxxv (New York, Banks & Brothers 1889). Davis is probably best known today for writing
a now-controversial headnote in the 1886 case Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1643.
266. DAVIS, supra note 265, at xxiii-xxv; see also BOURGUIGNON, supra note 177, at Preface
(noting that the Court of Appeals for Prize Cases remained "fresh in the minds" of those designing the
Constitution's federal judiciary).
267. For an entertaining account of the case, see Hampton L. Carson, The Case of the Sloop
"Active," 7 GREEN BAG 17 (1895). For an account of its impact on the Framing, see, for example,
BOURGUIGNON, supra note 177, at 133-34; and Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View ofFederal Court
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding ofArticle III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 774
n. 113 (1984). See also Sylvester, supra note 72, at 15-16 (describing the Continental Congress's
frustration over the failure presented by the case of the Active).
268. NAT'L ARCHIVES, THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR PRIZE CASES: RECORDS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CASES OF CAPTURE 1776-1787, at ix (1949) [hereinafter PRIZE CASES].
269. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 177, at 3-40 (explaining prize courts, letters of marque, and
privateering).
270. PRIZE CASES, supra note 268, at vi (noting that by 1784 the court stopped meeting on a
regular basis and that the salaries of the judges were rescinded in 1785, though the court would be called
into session again on a per-diem basis in 1786 for a handful of appeals).
271. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 177, at 238 ("Cases determined by the judges of appeals
involving issues of treaty interpretation were necessarily rare . . . . The only treaties the Americans
entered into during the war were the commercial treaty and the treaty of alliance with France in 1778
and the commercial treaty with the Netherlands, concluded just six months prior to the cessation of
hostilities.").
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But what remains speaks, however softly. References to Vattel, Grotius
and other writers on the law of nations lace the extant records of the Committee
and the Court of Appeals cases.272 The case of the Lusanna, one of the few
cases with a detailed record of the argument still surviving, essentially fell to a
debate over which among Richard Lee, William Blackstone, and Emmerich de
Vattel was the more authoritative on a particularly subtle question in the law of
captures.273 Turning to treaties, only one reported case before the Court of
Appeals involved more than a cursory examination of treaty interpretation.274
It involved the ship Resolution. Treaty textualism featured prominently.
i. Miller v. the Resolution
Miller v. the Resolution was an admiralty case decided by the
Pennsylvania Admiralty Court in 1781, and later reversed (in relevant part) by
275the Court of Appeals for Prize Cases. It occupies the enviable position of the
first reported federal case: 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1.276 The case turned on the
interpretation of two agreements: the alliance between France and America,
and the terms of the British surrender of the Isle of Dominica to France.
The facts of the case are suitably swashbuckling. The good ship
Resolution, belonging to Brandlight and Sons, merchants in Amsterdam, sailed
from Texel, a Dutch island in the Wadden Sea, on the 9th of January, 1780,
bound for the island of St. Eustatius in the Caribbean. From there, she set sail
for the island of Dominica, where she arrived on the 1st of October, 1780. In
March 1781, she sailed from Dominica for Amsterdam, with a valuable cargo
of sugar and coffee, belonging to various Dominican merchants, on
consignment to Brandlight and Sons, the aforementioned Dutch merchants and
owners of the Resolution.
She was captured by a British armed vessel and taken to Nevis, an island
in the Caribbean, where Admiral George Brydges Rodney-the Ist Baron
Rodney-examined her papers and determined that she could not be taken as a
British prize. She was released, only to be captured by another British vessel
shortly thereafter. She was then captured from her British captor by an
American privateer, then from this American privateer was taken by another
British ship, and then captured by yet another American, one Peter Miller, the
272. Id. at 179-90, 253-75 (describing extensive use of these authorities by the Committee).
273. Id. at 244-52 (describing the arguments in Lusanna in depth).
274. But see id. at 276 (noting two other unreported cases that implicated the American treaties
with France, both construed to return the vessels to the French). The report of the case of the Resolution
is not simply the only case to deal extensively with treaty interpretation, it is by far the longest and most
detailed of the reported cases from this period-the others are confined to about a page or less,
sometimes only a paragraph. See, e.g., The Experiment, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 41 (1787); Luke v. Hulbert, 2
U.S. (2 DalI.) 41 (1787); The Speedwell, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 40 (1784); The Squirrel, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 40
(1783).
275. Miller v. The Resolution, 17 F. Cas. 347 (Adm. Pa. 1781), affd in part, rev'd in part, 2
U.S. (2 DalI.) 1 (1781). The account that follows, with minor license, is derived from the Pennsylvania
Admiralty Court's recitation of the facts.
276. Cases in the first volume of the U.S. Reports are cases from the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Hyam's Lessee v. Edwards, 1 U.S. (I Dall.) 1 (Pa. 1759).
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libellant in the case. From there, Resolution was sent into the port of
Philadelphia.
Ownership of the vessel was easily resolved in the admiralty court. If the
British thought they could not take the vessel because it was a neutral vessel,
the American libellant could not take it as a prize either, even if he captured it
from the British.277 But the case of the cargo-the valuable sugar and coffee in
278the Resolution's hold-was more complicated. It was a Dutch ship, but it
was a Dominican cargo.
The ownership of the Resolution's cargo, wrote the Admiralty court,
"rests principally on one question, viz. whether the United States by their
alliance with France, are, or are not to be considered as parties in the
capitulation made by the Marquis De Bouilld with the inhabitants of
Dominica."279 The Pennsylvania Admiralty Court held this to be a matter of
treaty interpretation:
[Hiad Governor Stuart, when he surrendered the island to the Marquis De
Bouill6 expected that the United States should be bound by the terms of the
capitulation, he would have made this one of the articles, and not entrusted so
important a point to a speculative question, how far one ally may or may not be
virtually bound by the engagements of the other. This, however, he has not
done, either because it would imply an acknowledgment of the sovereignty of
the United States, or because he deemed the objects of the capitulation to be
limited to property within the island. Be this as it may, the British could not
reasonably complain that the French had violated the articles of the
capitulation, should the Americans take the goods of the inhabitants of
Dominica found upon the high seas, because such an assurance made no part of
the stipulation. "If he who can and ought to have explained himself clearly and
plainly, has not done it, it is the worse for him; he cannot be allowed to
introduce subsequent restrictions which he has not expressed." Vatt. Law Nat.
bk. 2, c. 17, § 264.2"0
The Pennsylvania Admiralty Court thus applied Vattel's interpretive rule as if it
were the substantive rule of treaty interpretation.281
The case was appealed to the Court of Prize Cases, where Gouverneur
282Morris and James Wilson, working as advocates for Miller, sought to
reverse the Pennsylvania Admiralty Court's judgment with respect to the
lawfulness of the capture of the Resolution, and to defend the Pennsylvania
277. See The Resolution, 17 F. Cas. at 349.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. This, it will be recalled, is Vattel's second maxim. VATTEL, supra note 70, at 245.
281. There was another ground for the court's holding with respect to the cargo as well. Judge
Hopkinson reasoned that "from a scrutiny of the papers found on board this vessel, there is strong reason
to believe that this cargo, however artificially covered, is, in fact British property" and was thus an
independent ground for awarding the cargo to Miller. The Resolution, 17 F. Cas. at 349.
282. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 177, at 221 (noting that Governeur Morris and James Wilson
were Miller's counsel in the case).
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court's judgment with respect to awarding Miller the cargo. The appeals
court, however, held against them, affirming the admiralty court's judgment as
to the vessel, and reversing the judgment of the admiralty court with respect to
the cargo. The Court of Appeals came to this conclusion, in essence, by
flipping the default expectations respecting American privateering. Whereas
the Admiralty Court thought that it would have been reasonable for Governor
Stuart to obtain assurances against American captures from the French in the
treaty itself, the Court of Prize Cases thought it eminently more reasonable for
the Governor to expect that the Americans-as France's allies-would be
thought automatically bound by France's compact.284 Wrote the court:
Vattel, a celebrated writer on the laws of nations, says, "when two nations make
war a common cause, they act as one body, and the war is called a society of
war; they are so clearly and intimately connected, that the Jus Postliminii takes
place among them, as among fellow subjects." 285
Thus, because the cargo would not have been legally subject to capture by
France according to the terms of its agreement with Britain, so too was it
shielded from capture by the Americans.286
While Wilson and Morris could not have been pleased with the outcome
of the case, both the Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty and the Court of Prize
Cases engaged in textual analyses where the terms of an unclear treaty were in
issue. Both courts made specific recourse to Vattel and the law of nations to
settle the interpretive question. And while they disagreed in outcome, their
methodologies were remarkable more for their similarities than their
differences.287
What can be gathered from The Resolution is this. In the time before the
Constitution was drafted, two influential Framers and a future Supreme Court
Justice, Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson, litigated over treaty
interpretation and the admiralty case employed Vattel's rules to resolve the
interpretative question. And in other cases from the same pre-constitutional
period, Vattel, Grotius, and other authorities were cited voluminously in the
Court of Appeals for Prize Cases-and in state courts-for other substantive
propositions relating to international law. Leading into the Framing convention,
where Wilson and his allies would testify to the capacity of judges to render
regular, constrained interpretations in treaty cases, it is likely he carried these
experiences and understandings of the judicial role with him.
283. The Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 1.
284. Id. at 15.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. James Wilson sought and obtained rehearing in the case on the basis of new evidence
showing that British merchants truly were using Dominica as a base of operations to evade American
privateers. The Court of Appeals reversed with respect to such cargo as could be proven to belong to
British merchants. See Miller v. The Resolution, 2 U.S. 19, 33 (1781) (rehearing). Nonetheless, the court
reaffirmed that the United States was otherwise bound by the terms of the treaty between France and
Britain with respect to Dominica's surrender to the French. Id.
2014] 325
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 39: 283
2. Treaty Interpretation in the Pre-Marshall Court, 1790-1801
President Washington signed the Judiciary Act of 1789 in the City of
New York on September 24, 1789.288 John Jay was appointed Chief Justice of
the new Court, and soon thereafter John Rutledge, William Cushing, James
Wilson, John Blair, and James Iredell were made Associate Justices.289
The practices of the early Supreme Court of the United States in the years
between these first appointments and the appointment of John Marshall to the
Chief Justiceship have a special importance in constitutional history. There can
be no doubt that, as many of these men participated actively and vigorously in
the development and ratification of the governing constitutional document, they
had particular knowledge of its intentions. More than this, however, to the
extent that the document left certain questions to be confirmed or set down by
practice and convention, it was these early Justices who were picked to set
those precedents.290 As the remainder of this section reveals, the interpretive
approaches and practices of the early Supreme Court confirm that treaties were
initially understood as instruments to be construed textually. Disputes over
interpretation in this first decade never wavered from this peremptory
commitment. Arguments about reasonable expectations and understandings of
text arose, but the Justices did not waver from their devotion, first and
foremost, to the text.
Treaty cases were relatively frequent in this formative period.291 Nearly
all of these cases related to the 1783 Treaty of Paris292 (the peace treaty that
ended the Revolutionary War 293), the 1788 Treaty of Amity and Commerce
294with France, and, in the latter half of the Court's first decade, the Jay Treaty
with Great Britain295 (a commercial treaty that also resolved some outstanding
issues with the Treaty of Paris29 ).27 In the years prior to Marshall's 1801
Chief Justiceship, the number of treaty cases the Supreme Court either
298docketed or adjudicated stood at ninety one. Beginning with State of
288. DAVIS, supra note 265, at xi.
289. Id. at xi-xii.
290. See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, in
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 117, 140-41 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1990).
291. See Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs:
An Empirical Study ofthe Supreme Court's Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 884 (2005).
292. See Yoo, Treaties, supra note 43, at 2076.
293. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Between the United States of America and his Britannic
Majesty (Treaty of Paris), U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
294. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Between the United States of America and His Most
Christian Majesty, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1788, 8 Stat. 12 (annulled July 7, 1798).
295. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Between His Britannic Majesty and the
United States of America, by their President, with the Advice and Consent of Their Senate (Jay Treaty),
U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116.
296. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 291, at 2076.
297. See Lavinbuk, supra note 291, at 884. Other cases related to the 1778 Treaty of Alliance
with France and the 1795 Treaty of Madrid with Spain. Id.
298. Charles Anthony Smith, Credible Commitments and the Early American Supreme Court,
42 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 75, 96 (2008).
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Georgia v. Brailsford, defendants relied on a treaty in 22 cases, and plaintiffs
relied upon a treaty in nine.299 In other words, a substantial number of the
cases heard by the Supreme Court between the Court's first meeting and the
beginning of the Marshall Era involved at least some treaty interpretation, with
a small number involving significant disputation over the proper interpretation
of a treaty's terms.
i. Georgia v. Brailsford
The first important case involving treaty interpretation was Georgia v.
Brailsford,3" the third in a line of Brailsford cases that would occupy the
Court from 1792 to 1794. The case was unusual. It arose under the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction,301 and was argued to a jury. 302 Yet, for all its
quirks, the Court's interpretation of the 1783 Treaty of Paris in the case casts
remarkable light upon both treaty textualism and presumptive self-execution.
To understand Brailsford requires a brief foray into contentious issues in
the early republic involving the confiscation of the property of British loyalists
and creditors by the states.303 As one might imagine, the states were unhappy
with those who had remained loyal to the Crown. Words like "treason" were
occasionally thrown around.304
Into the fray entered a few enterprising jurisdictions, like Georgia, that
sought to take all of the property they could from those they disliked-such as
British loyalists and British creditors. 305 So it came to pass that in May of
1782, near the end of the Revolutionary War and before both the Constitution
and the Treaty of Paris, Georgia enacted a law indicating that henceforth, debts
due to British merchants were going to be paid to Georgia.306 Needless to say,
British creditors in the years following responded by doing what creditors do:
they pretended Georgia's law did not exist and went about collecting their
307debts. Since the Americans had represented to Great Britain in the Treaty of
Paris that its creditors would be paid and its citizen's property returned,
lawsuits to enforce Article IV of the Treaty ensued.308
299. Id. at 98.
300. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794). See Daniel D, Blinka, "This Germ of Rottedness": Federal
Trials in the New Republic, 1789-1807,36 CREIGHTON L. REv. 135, 163-66 (2003).
301. Blinka, supra note 300, at 163.
302. Id.
303. Golove, supra note 50, at 1116-17; see also Ann Woolhandler, Treaties, Self-Execution,
and the Public Law Litigation Model, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 757, 773-74 (2002) (describing various creditor
protection mechanisms, including the Contract Clause, to prevent the expropriation of British wealth by
States); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1920-23 (1983) (describing the conditions leading to the controversy in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793)).
304. Georgia. v. Brailsford (Brailsford 1), 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 402-03 (1792) (describing a
Georgia act "for inflicting penalties on, and confiscating the estates of, such persons as are therein
declared guilty of treason, and for other purposes therein mentioned").
305. Id. at 403 (describing how Georgia had elected to confiscate the property of such persons).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 404.
308. See, e.g., id. at 402-04; Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 201-02 (1796).
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Brailsford made three appearances in the Supreme Court. In the first,
Brailsford I in 1792, the facts were as follows. Three British creditors (one of
them a British citizen, who had always resided in Britain, named Brailsford)
sued in federal court in Georgia to recover a debt from 1774.309 Georgia sought
to intervene in the action, arguing that it was owed the debt and had never
relinquished the right-by joining the United States or otherwise-it had given
itself by virtue of its 1782 confiscation law.310 The question for the Court in
Brailsford I was thus whether the district court had properly denied Georgia's
motion to intervene, and whether Georgia was entitled at least to an injunction
pending resolution of the jurisdictional question. 3 Georgia obtained the
injunction, but was denied leave to intervene, since Georgia was both entitled
to, and limited to, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction (at least according
to Justice Iredell who had heard the case below while riding circuit
3 12). 3 1
Justices Blair, Wilson, and Jay nominally agreed, and were at least willing to
grant the injunction and allow Georgia to go back and file an action against the
debt in the proper court and manner. 314 Wilson, for instance, thought
Georgia-if she elected to do so-could bring an action anywhere. 3 15 Justices
Cushing and Johnson would have placed the burden on Georgia to sue
Brailsford separately in an action at common law to recover the debt, but did
not reach the question of where that suit might be filed.
Brailsford I thus resolved little and offered much, at least in the way of
pathways to future litigation. The parties obliged. In February 1793 they
returned to the Supreme Court for Brailsford II. 3 Chief Justice Jay, writing
for the Court, declared that except for Justices Iredell and Blair, "All the Court .
. . are of opinion, that, if the State of Georgia has a right to the debt .. . it is a
right to be pursued at common law" and that therefore Georgia needed to sue
Brailsford and his compatriots rather than inject itself in an action between
Brailsford and his debtors. If, however, it did not do so before the next Term,
Georgia's injunction would be dissolved.
These petite issues resolved, the Court finally reached the weighty
question in the case-whether the Georgia law was valid given its manifest
conflict with the 1783 Treaty of Paris. The Court confronted the question in
309. Brailsfordl, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 404.
310. Id.
311. Id. For an in-depth account of the precise arguments in the case, see John R. Kroger,
Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the History ofAmerican Judging, 34 HoUs. L. REV. 1425, 1440-
45 (1998).
312. Circuit riding was a particularly onerous task required of all Supreme Court Justices in the
early republic. For more information about the practice, see Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme
Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 1753, 1753 (2003).
313. Brailsfordl, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 406 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
314. Id.; id. at 407 (opinion of Blair, J.); id at 407 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 409 (opinion of
Jay, J.).
315. Id. at 407 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
316. Id. at 405 (opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 408 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
317. Georgia v. Brailsford (Brailsford H), 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 416 (1793).
318. Id. at 418.
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Brailsford II. 319 Georgia elected to bring its action, per Justice Iredell, in the
Supreme Court of the United States.3 20 The Court empaneled a special jury,
and the Court's unanimous opinion is thus unique321 in that it is also a jury
charge.322 The Court instructed the jury that Brailsford was entitled to his debt
"as the very terms of the treaty [of Paris], revived the right of action to recover
the debt," and that were Georgia allowed to intercede even to "sequester[]" the
debt its actions would constitute an "impediment to the recovering of a bona
fide debt, due to a British creditor, in direct opposition to the fourth article of
the treaty." 323 After this explanation, the jury, "without going again from the
bar," returned a verdict for Brailsford and his co-defendants. 32 4
The Brailsford Court's interpretation of the Treaty of Paris is a
remarkable example of the Court's early use of treaty textualism. The terms of
Article IV of the Treaty of Paris could not have been clearer. The Article reads,
in its entirety, "[i]t is agreed that Creditors on either Side shall meet with no
lawful Impediment to the Recovery of the full Value in Sterling Money of all
bona fide Debts heretofore contracted." 325 Georgia sought to evade the Treaty
for a half-dozen pretended reasons, including that the Treaty of Paris was not
self-executing and that the treaty by its terms only referred to future
confiscation and not debts already confiscated. 326 Notably, the Court dealt
with these arguments not by reference to clumsy presumptions about self-
execution or prospectivity,327 but by reference simply to language. The treaty's
text was manifestly clear, and "the very terms . . . revived the [state law] right
of action to recover the debt."328 Case closed.
ii. Ware v. Hylton
Similarly Brailsfordian issues arose in one of the Supreme Court's most
319. Georgia v. Brailsford (BrailsfordlI), 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 1, 1 (1794).
320. Id. at 1.
321. Lochlan F. Shelfer, Note, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE L.J. 208, 208-10
(2013) (noting that "the nation's highest federal court has presided over a jury trial in only one reported
case, Georgia v. Brailsford (1794)," although it has presided over two unreported cases).
322. Brailsford III, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 4.
323. Id. at 5.
324. Id.
325. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Between the United States of America and His Britannic
Majesty (Treaty of Paris), U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 2 U.S.T. 151.
326. Brailsford II, 3 U.S. at 2. For an account of Georgia's "embarrassing" positions on this
issue with respect to the young republic's international reputation, see Gibbons, supra note 303, at 1920-
23.
327. As added insurance, however, counsel for the defendants cited Vattel, Grotius, and
Pufendorf, among many other writers, for interpretive rules that favored allowing the creditors to
recover under the terms of the treaty. Brailsford III, 3 U.S. at 3.
328. Id. at 5. The Supreme Court was hardly alone in discarding such arguments without
comment. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania drew the same conclusion on the same issue six years
earlier on the precisely the same terms in Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 233 (Pa. Jan. 1788).
Georgia sought refuge in a Pennsylvania Common Pleas case that had ruled that a Connecticut citizen
was not covered by Article IV of the Treaty of Peace because he was not a British citizen but an
American traitor. See Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 393 (Pa. Com. Pl. Dec. 1788). This would
seem a straightforward textual distinction.
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famous early treaty cases, the 1796 case of Ware v. Hylton.329 Ware is a case
where all of the Justices but Iredell focused intensely on the text of the treaty
though, ironically, Justice Iredell had no vote.33 0
Ware involved Virginia's version of the Georgia law at issue in
Brailsford.331 In 1777, Virginia passed an act allowing citizens of the State to
pay their debts to British creditors to Virginia, with the promise that the balance
of their British debt would be prorated by the amount paid to Virginia.332
Hylton had paid at least some part of the debt to Virginia in 1780, three years
before the Treaty of Paris, and had received a receipt (signed by Governor
Thomas Jefferson) indicating his payment.333 In 1779, Virginia passed a true
confiscation act in the style of the Georgia Act, doubly insulating Hylton from
the responsibility to pay (or so he argued).334 Hylton further argued that
because Britain had not withdrawn some its troops from the United States, it
was in violation of the peace treaty, obviating Hylton's responsibility to pay.335
Finally, he contended that the outbreak of war nullified all debts contracted
before the war.336
All of these arguments turned, in the end, on the Court's understanding of
the Treaty of Paris. Ware rested his case on Article IV,337 which as we have
seen, could not have been written more plainly.338 The lower court resolved all
issues in favor of Ware, except the issue of the payments made to the State of
Virginia according to the Act of 1777. The general question for the Supreme
Court was thus reduced to this: whether, by paying into the loan office of
Virginia, Hylton was discharged from his debt to Ware. 339
We now know quite a lot about the circumstances of the negotiations that
led to the 1783 Treaty of Paris. We know, for instance, that the treaty-
negotiators for the United States were unsure at the time the treaty was
negotiated that they could actually keep their promise to the British that the
States would abide by Article IV.340 We know that the British wanted, first and
foremost, to ensure their creditors would be paid. 341 The Justices on the
Supreme Court were probably as aware of the circumstances of the negotiations
329. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
330. Justice Iredell heard the case below while riding circuit and was not permitted to vote upon
his own judgment. 7 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
1789-1800, 220 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2003) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT 1789-1800].
331. Id. at 199; see also supra text accompanying notes 300-308. (describing enactment of
Georgia law providing for confiscation of debts owed to Great Britain and British subjects).
332. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 199-200.
333. Id. at 200.
334. Id. at 200-01.
335. Id. at 201-02.
336. Id. at 203.
337. Id. at 203-05.
338. Id. at 206-07.
339. Id. at 207.
340. Golove, supra note 50, at 1116-18.
341. Id. at 1116.
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that led to the Treaty's terms as contemporary scholars are.342 If ever there
were grounds for a Justice to account for the circumstances of a treaty's
negotiation-its aims, purposes, and negotiating history-given its immense
importance, Ware would be the case.
Yet, the parties who argued the case relied not on the record of
negotiations or the peculiar circumstances under which the treaty was made but
instead molded their arguments to the text. Though he could have made
crushing policy arguments about the need to honor British claims, or drawn the
Court's attention to the primacy British negotiators' placed on ensuring that
British creditors received full compensation, the attorney for the plaintiffs,
Edward Tilighman, a prominent Philadelphia attorney, argued the case entirely
through the lens of Vattel's textual interpretive rules. 343
When future Chief Justice John Marshall rose to speak for the defendants
in Ware, 3" he too did not invoke drafting history or extrinsic foreign policy
considerations. Rather, with the plain import of the text against him, he sought
to appeal to the Court's sense of equity, arguing, that the British creditors
should sue Virginia for the debts, not his clients.345 After all, "the fair and
rational construction of the instrument itself, is sufficient for the defendant's
cause. The words ought, surely, to be very plain, that shall work so evident a
hardship, as to compel a man to pay a debt, which he had before
extinguished." , His co-counsel Alexander Campbell attempted to buoy
Marshall's arguments with extensive citations to Vattel, though not for his
interpretive rules. Rather, Campbell sought to argue that Vattel's default rules
with respect to the laws of war and peace somehow superseded the treaty's
plain terms.347
The Justices rendered their opinions in Ware seriatim. Justice Chase
spoke first. He held that Virginia, as a matter of the law of nations, had a right
to pass the law of 1777. As such, the case turned on the status of the Treaty of
Paris and its capacity to rescind the law.348 The text of the Supremacy Clause
resolved the status of the treaty because of its intended retrospective
application. 349 Thus, the question was simply this: Did the Treaty of Paris
abrogate the Virginia law? Here is how Chase interpreted the treaty: "It is
evident on a perusal of it [the treaty] what were the great and principal objects
in view by both parties."350 He listed its great and principal objects at length
then continued:
342. Id. at 1116-22.
343. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 209-10 (recounting the arguments of Edward Tilighman).
344. Notably, though he enjoyed "considerable prestige as an attorney," this would be the
future Chief Justice's only appearance before the Supreme Court. Samuel R. Olken, Chief Justice John
Marshall and the Course ofAmerican Constitutional History, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 743, 753 (2000).
345. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 213-14 (recounting the arguments of John Marshall).
346. Id. at 213 (recounting the arguments of John Marshall).
347. Id. at 215-17.
348. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 235 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
349. Id. at 236.
350. Id. at 238-39 (opinion of Chase, J.).
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Before I consider this article of the treaty, I will adopt the following remarks,
which I think applicable, and which may be found in Dr. Rutherforth and
Vattel. (2 Ruth. 307 to 315.35' Vattel lib. 2. c. 17. sect, 263 and 271.352) The
intention of the framers of the treaty, must be collected from a view of the
whole instrument, and from the words made use of by them to express their
intention, or from probable or rational conjectures. If the words express the
meaning of the parties plainly, distinctly, and perfectly, there ought to be no
other means of interpretation ... 353
Justice Chase then dissected Article IV of the treaty (as short as it is)
word-by-word and clause-by-clause.354 He continued, "[i]f the words of the
fourth article taken separately, truly bear the meaning I have given them, their
sense collectively, cannot be mistaken, and must be the same." 355 Chase's
textual analysis continues in incredible sophistication and detail for several
356pages more, finally concluding that the text is unambiguous. Justice
Patterson, who spoke next, agreed with Justice Chase, also on purely textual
grounds, also invoking Vattel's interpretive rules, writing, "[t]he fourth article
appears to me to come within the first general maxim of interpretation laid
down by Vattel.' 357 Thus, Justices Paterson and Chase both held for the
plaintiffs irrespective of equitable arguments in favor of the sympathetic
American debtor, both on the ground that the text of the Treaty of Paris was
indisputably clear.
Justice Iredell, who had heard the case below, read his opinion-as was
the practice of the time-but it was of dubious precedential consequence as he
was not permitted to vote upon the case (having heard the case while riding
circuit). He alone among the Justices would have found that there was no
debt-because Hylton had paid Virginia-and thus nothing for the words of
Article IV "to operate upon." 359 Yet even his argument was ultimately
textualist. He argued that "if Congress thought such a case [as the one before
the Court] ought to have been comprehended, I presume they would have
recommended a special provision, clearly comprehending such cases, and
accompanied with a full indemnity."360 As such, Justice Iredell would have
flipped the presumption-as John Marshall had asked the Court to do-and
required the British negotiators to speak more clearly if they sought to collect
debts that had already been paid into State treasuries. While Iredell thought
351. RUTHERFORTH, supra note 176, at 307-15 (these are the opening pages of Rutherforth's
chapter on interpretation).
352. VATTEL, supra note 70, at 252. These are Vattel's First General Maxim that further
interpretation is unnecessary where the text is clear, id. at 263, and that terms are to be explained
conformably to common usage, id. at 271.
353. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 239-40. (opinion of Chase, J.).
354. Id. at 240-42.
355. Id. at 242.
356. Id. at 242-45.
357. Id. at 253 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
358. DOcUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 1789-1800, supra note 330, at 220.
359. Id. at 221 & n.85. (quoting Ware, 3 U.S. at 284 (opinion of Iredell, J.)).
360. 3 U.S. at 280 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
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other considerations-such as fairness and justice-succored his position, he
ultimately fell back on an argument about text in the treaty.
Justice Wilson announced his opinion in six short paragraphs. He thought
the text so unmistakably clear it warranted but one of them. Wrote Wilson,
"[T]he treaty annuls the confiscation. The fourth article is well expressed to
meet the very case . . . . It is impossible by any glossary, or argument, to make
the words more perspicuous, more conclusive, than by a bare recital."
Finally, Justice Cushing spoke. Keeping his opinion brief as well, he
focused only on Article IV. Cushing rejected the defendant's arguments that the
understanding of the negotiators should bear on the Court's disposition of the
case, writing, "I do not see that we can collect the private opinion of the
negotiators, respecting their powers, by what they did not do; and if we could,
this court is not bound by their opinion, unless the reasons on which it was
founded, being known, were convincing." 362 Like Wilson, Cushing thought the
text of the treaty unmistakable, writing, "[T]he words, 'shall meet with no
lawful impediment,' etc. are as strong as the wit of man could devise, to avoid
all effects of sequestration, confiscation, or any other obstacle thrown in the
way, by any law, particularly pointed against the recovery of such debts."363
On the issue of the clarity of the treaty's text, the case was 4-0. The
Justices not only looked to the text of the treaty: Justice Cushing specifically
renounced recourse to the understandings of the treaty's negotiators. Justices
Wilson, Paterson, and Chase each found the text unmistakable. Justices
Paterson and Chase both explicitly invoked Vattel's deeply textualist
interpretive rules to support their positions in the case. The only Justice who
would have found that Article IV of the Treaty of Paris did not require that
Hylton pay the debt at issue, Justice Iredell, did not even have a vote. And even
he, ultimately, would have relied upon the text to reach his conclusion.
iii. Other Treaty Interpretation Decisions from the Court's
First Decade
The significance of Ware cannot be overstated. Justice Iredell called the
case "the greatest Cause which ever came before a Judicial Court in the
World.",36 Ware settled the fate not just of Daniel Hylton, but thousands of
American debtors.365 Ware was the case that the young nation had been
waiting for, bracing for, perhaps even hoping for-proof to the world of its
maturity.366 "When the federal courts opened in 1790, British creditors leapt at
361. Id. at 281 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
362. Id. at 284 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
363. Id. at 284 (opinion Cushing, J.). This was, it seems, a reference to the fact that the
negotiators may have thought that they were unable to bind the states to Article IV when they negotiated
the Treaty. See supra text accompanying notes 340-342. Justice Cushing thought their opinion on the
subject irrelevant.
364. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 1789-1800, supra note 330, at 203 &
n. 1.
365. Id. at 203.
366. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 31, at 1057-61 (describing the impact of Ware on the
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the opportunity, finally, to sue their Virginian debtors. Despite a jurisdictional
amount-in-controversy requirement of $500, the circuit court docket filled up
with these suits."367 The original plaintiff in the case, William Jones, filed
more than twenty suits alone against his debtors when the circuit courts opened
in 1790.
But Brailsford and Ware are hardly unique. They are, rather, exemplars of
a strong treaty textualism practiced by the Supreme Court in the republic's first
decade. In case after case, the Court hewed to a steady fidelity to text. This was
the Supreme Court the Framers had envisioned, a court that could protect "the
security of foreigners where treaties are in their favor."369 It was a court that
would construe treaty text in a manner free from local prejudice according to
fixed rules and precedents. 370
To give more examples, in The Betsey the Court was famously called
upon to construe whether the federal courts possessed a general prize
jurisdiction as part of their constitutionally conferred admiralty jurisdiction.3 7'
A lesser-known argument in the case involved whether an American admiralty
court, even if it had jurisdiction, would be barred from adjudicating the status
of a French prize according to the 1788 Treaty of Amity and Commerce
between the United States and France. The French captor attempted to argue
that the treaty's seventeenth article372 precluded any inquiry by an American
court into whether an American or neutral vessel, rather than an enemy vessel,
had been lawfully captured. Counsel for the appellants replied to this strange
argument thusly:
The words [of the seventeenth article] . . . are directly against that construction;
and even were it otherwise, the absurdity and injustice of the consequences
which flow from it, would demand a different construction. Vatt. b. s. p. 369.
Gro s. 22. p. 365.37 Puff. 544. s. 19. p. 1.374 rot. 358 s. 12. p. 2. Vatt. b. s.
282.p. 380.381. The sense must be limited, as the subject of the compact
requires; and when a case arises, in which it would be too prejudicial to take a
law according to the rigor of the terms, a restrictive interpretation should be
international reputation of the United States).
367. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 1789-1800, supra note 330, at 204 &
nn.6-7.
368. Id. at 206.
369. 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 238 (June 13, 1787) (statement of Edmund
Randolph, agreed to unanimously by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention).
370. But see Eskridge, supra note 40, at 1064 (criticizing the Justices' interpretation of Article
IV of the treaty in Ware as not a "persuasive exposition of the treaty's words"). Professor Eskridge
further contends that "the Justices typically paid due regard to statutory words and often spoke of their
primacy, but often failed to analyze the import of statutory language in any careful way." Id.
371. Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 6 (1794); DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT 1789-1800, supra note 330, at 296-312.
372. Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States of America and His Most
Christian Majesty, U.S.-Fr., art. 17, Feb. 6, 1788, 8 Stat. 12 (annulled July 7, 1798).
373. GROTIus, supra note 20, at 875 (arguing that one may impose a restriction on the meaning
of words where it is plain the speaker never meant them to encompass the case).
374. PUFENDORF, supra note 21, at 547-48.
375. VATTEL, supra note 70, at 252 (arguing that we ought to reject every interpretation that
leads to an absurdity).
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used. Vatt. b.s. 292.p.391."' Grot. s.27.p. 361. Vatt. b.s.295.p.392.
The Court unanimously held the district courts possessed prize
jurisdiction and remanded the case to Maryland district court for further
proceedings. 379 While I have been unable to locate a record of the district
court's subsequent judgment on remand, it would have been quite surprising for
the Supreme Court to grant such jurisdiction without mentioning the treaty
issue unless the Court expected the district court to exercise that jurisdiction to
protect American and neutral vessels from capture by the French.
In United States v. Lawrence the Supreme Court faced another early test,
this one over the Consular Convention between the United States and France. 380
A federal judge in New York, Judge Lawrence, refused to issue an arrest
warrant for an alleged French sailor-deserter, and the Attorney General of the
United States sought a writ of mandamus to require Lawrence to issue the
warrant. France's authority to seek an arrest warrant, in turn, arose from
Article 9 of the 1788 Consular Convention between the United States and
France, which held that the consuls of each nation could seek the arrest of naval
deserters found in each other's territory.382
At issue for the Supreme Court was the judicial administration of the
antidesertion Article. The Article set forth the method of proving a man was a
deserter: Consuls could come to court demanding in writing that deserters be
arrested and could prove the legitimacy of their demand "by an exhibition of
the register of the vessel, or ship's roll, that those men were part of the said
crews." 383 The Article continues "on this demand, so proved, (saving,
however, where the contrary is proved) the delivery shall not be refused; and
there shall be given all aid and assistance to the said Consuls and Vice-Consuls
for the search, seizure, and arrest, of the said deserters . . . ."3
The federal judge said he could not issue the arrest warrant because the
Article provided one, and only one, means of proving that a man was a
deserter: the "exhibition" of the ship's roll.385 The Supreme Court found this
interpretation of the treaty absurd-not on grounds that it would interfere with
American foreign policy nor because the Executive branch had urged the court
to construe the treaty a certain way-but based solely on the treaty's text.38
376. Id. at 258.
377. GROTIUS, supra note 20, at 877-79.
378. The Betsey, 3 U.S. at 12; see VATTEL, supra note 23, at 260;.
379. 3 U.S. at 16.
380. United States v. Judge Lawrence, 3 U.S. 42 (1795); see also 6 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1800, 522-29 (Maeva Marcus ed.,
2003) (describing the case).
381. Lawrence, 3 U.S. at42
382. Id. at 43.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 51. Note that this was likely a subtle importation into the treaty of the old-fashioned
rule of lenity, since deserters could be imprisoned and deported based upon whatever ex parte proof the
court ultimately accepted.
386. Id. (citing Vattel and Rutherforth's interpretive rules).
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Indeed, the Attorney General argued that "the Executive of the United States
had no inclination to press upon the Court, any particular construction of the
article" but that he sought mandamus because in "the spirit of our political
Constitution, the Judiciary Department is called upon to decide [treaty
questions]; for it is essential to the independence of that department, that
judicial mistakes should only be corrected by judicial authority."387 The Court
ultimately decided it could not issue the writ, even though it strongly disagreed
with the interpretation of the district court, because the decision was within the
district judge's discretion.
More examples could be tendered, for more abound. In The Phoebe Anne,
a case construing the 1788 Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France, Chief
Justice Ellsworth decided the case for the Court, textually, in a single
paragraph. On the assertion that the United States should not allow French
privateers to obtain repairs in American ports because it might involve the
United States in the ongoing naval conflict between France and Britain,
Ellsworth replied (in a two sentence opinion): "Suggestions of policy and
conveniency cannot be considered in the judicial determination of a question of
,,38939
right."9 The text being clear, the decree of the circuit court was affirmed.
These cases converge on a few basic principles. In case after case, before
John Marshall's ascent to the Chief Justiceship in 1801 and the ascent of the
Supreme Court that followed, the early Supreme Court eschewed questions of
policy and convenience, recourse to history and subjective intent, and instead
construed treaties according to the textual interpretive rules set out by
authorities like Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and
others. 391 This practice reflected the embodiment of the intention of the
Framers to create a judiciary that would render binding, uniform, predictable
interpretive decisions. And upon this careful, restrained judicial path, Chief
Justice Marshall's Court would follow that early Court's lead.
3. Treaty Interpretation in the Marshall Court, 1801-1835
John Marshall's appointment to Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court came in the Adams administration's waning days. 392 Night
seemed to be falling on the Federalist dream.393 The prevailing Republican
387. Id. at 48-49.
388. Id. at 53-54.
389. Moodie v. The Phoebe Anne, 3 U.S. 319, 319 (1796).
390. Id.
391. For cases taking similarly textual approaches to treaty interpretation, see Hunter v.
Fairfax's Devisee, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); Cooper v.
Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800); Sims' Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425 (1799); Geyer v. Michel
(The Donzekeren), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 285 (1796); United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795);
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795); Bingham v. Cabbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19 (1795); and
Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795).
392. Eskridge, supra note 40, at 1070-71.
393. Cf Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1236-38 & nn.1-9 (2003)
(describing the Jefferson Administration's and Republican Congress's refusal to recognize President
Adams's late-term appointments, arbitrary impeachment of Federalist judges, revocation of statutory
authority for the federal circuit courts, and shuttering of the Supreme Court for the June 1802 Term).
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candidate, Thomas Jefferson, was set to assume the presidency along with
overwhelming majorities in Congress. 394 Federalist judges manned the
judiciary, but the courts were fragile, and it was uncertain whether the new
party in power would preserve the Constitution's parchment promises of an
independent, life-tenured federal judiciary. 39 5 As it was, in their bid to hold
onto power, the Federalists had compromised some of their own high ideals-
jailing newspaper editors396 and vastly expanding the size of the federal
judiciary in a bid to hold onto the third branch.397 The Republicans, for their
part, began their tenure by fulfilling the Federalist's worst fears: repealing the
Judiciary Act of 1801, cancelling the Supreme Court's 1802 term, and
embarking on a program of judicial impeachments.398 It was a constitutional
crisis.
The appointment of John Marshall to the Chief Justiceship may have been
the decision that saved the Constitution. An influential and ardent Federalist, he
was, also, thankfully, one of the most brilliant lawyers and politicians of his
generation.39 9 Casting off partisanship in favor of high judicial authority,
Justice Marshall steered a course of careful, consensus-driven jurisprudence
founded on deep principles that earned the Court nationwide respect and, with
it, newfound constitutional powers.40 In doing so, Justice Marshall defined the
Court's identity in a way that the briefly-tenured Chief Justices Jay, Rutledge,
and Ellsworth had been unable to. 01
In the area of treaty interpretation what Chief Justice Marshall brought to
the Court was continuity. While he revolutionized the way in which the Justices
rendered their opinions-cementing the practice of single "majority" opinions
rather than opinions seriatim and driving for consensus over ideological
purity402 -his Court maintained a careful attention to text in the treaty cases
394. Id.
395. Eskridge, supra note 40, at 1070-71.
396. Kurt T. Lash, "Tucker's Rule": St. George Tucker and the Limited Construction of
Federal Power, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1363-65 (2006); William E. Nelson, The Province of
the Judiciary, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 329-30 (2004).
397. Weinberg, supra note 393, at 1236-37.
398. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept ofJudicial Review,
42 DUKE L.J. 279, 318-20 (1992); Eskridge, supra note 40, at 1070-71.
399. See 1-4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1916). He also knew the
stakes of his appointment: "Of the importance of the judiciary at all times, but more especially the
present I am very fully impressed & I shall endeavor in the new office to which I am called not to
disappoint my friends." John Marshall, Letter from John Marshall to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
(Mar. 4, 1801), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 89 (1990). So did Thomas Jefferson: "So great is
his sophistry you must never give him an affirmative answer, or you will be forced to grant his
conclusion. Why, if he were to ask me whether it were daylight or not, I'd reply, 'Sir, I don't know, I
can't tell."'). GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815,
at 434 (2009).
400. See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, Samuel Chase: In Defense of the Rule of Law and Against
the Jeffersonians, 62 VAND. L. REV. 349, 365-66 (2009); Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review:
Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. REV. 609, 639-41 (2003); Jean Edward Smith,
Marshall Misconstrued: Activist? Partisan? Reactionary?, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1109, 1115-16
(2000).
401. See Olken, supra note 344, at 743 & n.2.
402. See M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of
Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 286-87, 311-25 (2007); Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John
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decided during his tenure. While the Court heard dozens of treaty cases during
Chief Marshall's Chief Justiceship-more than could be chronicled in the
pages that follow-a selection from its outset, middle-period, and close well
illustrate the Court's careful, textualist approach to treaty interpretation during
his time on the Court.
i. Early Marshall Court Treaty Cases
There are at least a half-dozen treaty cases from the early Marshall
period, but the interpretive questions are pedestrian. In United States v.
Schooner Peggy the Marshall court construed a treaty settling the Quasi-War
between the United States and France. The treaty provided that the United
States would restore ships captured on the "high seas" to the French if they had
not yet been "definitively condemned." 403 Whether the schooner was captured
on the high seas was a question for another court, and that the ship had not been
definitively condemned was easily discerned.40
In Ogden v. Blackledge, in a one-paragraph opinion, the Court held that
Article IV of the Treaty of Paris required North Carolina to allow a British
creditor to sue beyond the statute of limitations because the confiscation law,
and the war, had constituted an impediment to the collection of the debt.405
Similarly, in Dunlop & Co. v. Ball, the Court decreed that Virginia's common
law statute of limitations would be tolled to account for the State's obstruction
of the implementation of the Treaty of Peace.406 These debt and confiscation
issues returned to the Supreme Court again and again in this period-always
without much or any discussion of interpretation-all with the same result
under the language of the treaty.407 Prosaic issues also arose with respect to the
rights of British subjects and citizens to inherit property, but those cases turned
more on the law of nations and common law than interpretation, as the relevant
treaties were either clear or silent about inheritance and title to property.40 8 A
neat insurance case involving whether an American vessel attempted to run the
blockade of the port of Cadiz did arise in 1808, but the fact that the Court was
"of opinion that these facts do not amount . . . under the treaty between the
United States and Great Britain, to a breach of the blockade of Cadiz" is not
particularly illuminating.409
Marshall As Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1421, 1442-43 (2006); Samuel R. Olken, The Ironies of
Marbury v. Madison and John Marshall's Judicial Statesmanship, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 391, 414-15
(2004).
403. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 103-04 (1801).
404. Id. at 109-10.
405. Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272, 278-79 (1804).
406. Dunlop & Co. v. Ball, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 180, 184-85 (1804).
407. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286, 306 (1810); Owings v. Norwood's
Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 347-48 (1809); Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 415, 418-19
(1808); Hopkirk v. Bell, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 164, 164-65 (1807); Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454,
458 (1806).
408. See, e.g., Mcllvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 214-15 (1808) (noting that
whatever rights there are, they do not arise from the "terms of the treaty"); M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 305 (1805); Lambert's Lessee v. Paine, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 97, 108-09 (1805).
409. Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 185, 202 (1808). Notice, however,
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Rather, the next truly important treaty case would not arise until Fairfax's
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee,410 fully a decade after Marshall assumed the title
"Chief Justice," at the dawn of the Marshall's Court's middle period.
ii. The Middle Period: 1812-1828
The years bookended by Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee in 1812
and Foster v. Neilson411 in 1829 were years of enormous tumult in the United
412States and on the Supreme Court. Justice Joseph Story was appointed to the
Court by James Madison in 1811, and would stand alongside Chief Justice
Marshall as Marshall's colleague, mythologizer, promoter, and a force of
413nature in his own right for decades. The War of 1812 would occur, and the
British would bum the White House.414 The Court would be pressed to decide
such landmark constitutional cases as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816),415
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819),416 Cohens v. Virginia (1821),417 Johnson v.
M'Intosh (1823),418 Gibbons v. Ogden (1824),419 and Osborn v. Bank of the
United States (1824).420
But throughout the period, at least in the area of treaty interpretation, the
Court maintained a careful adherence to text. In case after case, the Court held
true to the principles set down by the Framers, the ratifiers, and the practices of
the early Supreme Court.
a. The Land Ownership Cases
The middle 20 years of the Marshall Court are a swelter of treaty cases,
some of them among the most important in the Court's history, such as the
"Fairfax Estate" cases, Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee,421 and Martin v.
that the case is an excellent example of treaty textualism in action, however low the stakes. See, e.g., id.
at 200.
410. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 614 (1812).
411. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
412. For a fascinating account of this Court and its era, see G. Edward White, The Working Life
of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L. REv. 1 (1984); Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the
"Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1126-44 (2001); and Gordon S. Wood, The
Origins ofJudicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More Out ofLess, 56 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 787 (1999).
413. For more on the judicial tenure of Justice Story see Gerald Dunne's excellent multipart
effort in the Harvard Law Review: Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story: The Middle Years, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1679 (1967); Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story: The Great Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 877, 878 (1966);
Gerald T. Dunne, Joseph Story: 1812 Overture, 77 HARV. L. REv. 240, 246 (1963); and Gerald T.
Dunne, Joseph Story: The Germinal Years, 75 HARV. L. REv. 707 (1962).
414. Griffin B. Bell III, John Marshall: Presidential Power and Foreign Intelligence, Address
at the Awarding of the John Marshall Foundation Medal in Law (Sep. 27, 2009), in 18 J.S. LEGAL HIST.
265, 266-67 (2010).
415. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
416. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
417. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
418. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
419. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
420. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
421. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812).
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Hunter's Lessee.422 Yet even though the cases were extraordinarily important,
the interpretive issues could not have been less doubtful. Foreign citizens were
promised all the incidents of ownership,423 and the Supreme Court was going
to ensure they received them. While the Supreme Court's ringing rejection of a
federalism clear statement rule424 in Fairfax's Devisee425 could be thought
noteworthy-the Court's rejection of a similar clear statement rule with respect
to the collection of British debts in Ware v. Hylton (notably pressed by future
Chief Justice Marshall),426 makes it not particularly surprising. The textualism
practiced by the Marshall Court did not, it seems, make widespread use of clear
statement rules. The most scandalous thing that can be said about the Fairfax
Estate cases is that they required the Supreme Court to intervene at all.
The reason the Supreme Court had to intervene, of course, was not
because the interpretive issues were difficult, but because Republicans
fervently disagreed with the Supreme Court's nationalist conception of federal
427power. Virginia wanted to reserve to itself the power to decide the question
of who could own and inherit property in Virginia. The Treaty of Paris and the
Jay Treaty deprived the state of control over that question, and in so doing, the
Supreme Court became the final arbiter of who inherited and owned property
428like Fairfax's estate. When the Court confronted the same resistance to
federal power from Maryland with respect to the ownership by French citizens
under the French Treaty of 1778 and Convention of 1800, Chirac v. Chirac 's
Lessee was the result-again finding that a treaty assured all the accoutrements
of ownership to French citizens.429 Weighty though it was, like the Virginia
cases, it was also easy as an interpretive matter. 430 The sheer number of similar
treaty cases that came before the Supreme Court in the period, dealing simply
with enforcement of the rights to inherit and devise property promised by
various international treaties, is absolutely astonishing.431
422. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
423. See, e.g., The Jay Treaty, art. 9, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 2 U.S.T. 245, 253-54;
Preliminary Articles of Peace art. 6, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 30, 1782, in 2 U.S.T. 96, 99 ("[T]here shall be
no future Confiscations made . . . ."); Treaty of Amity and Commerce art. 13, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, 2
U.S.T. 3, 11-12 (promising full incidents of ownership to French citizens).
424. That is, a rule that would require a treaty to speak clearly if it were intended to displace
state law or impinge on important state interests. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)
(embracing a clear statement rule disfavoring federal regulation where laws "would upset the usual
constitutional balance of federal and state powers"). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L.
REv. 593, 599-611 (1992) (discussing federalism clear statement rules).
425. See Golove, supra note 50, at 1202.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 344-347.
427. For an excellent account of the Fairfax cases and their nationalist implications, see
Golove, supra note 50, at 1193-1210.
428. Id.
429. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817).
430. See, e.g., id at 271 ("Upon every principle offair construction, this article [of the treaty]
gave to the subjects of France a right to purchase and hold lands in the United States." (emphasis
added)).
431. See, e.g., Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825); Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 489 (1824); Blight's Lessee v. Rochester, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 535 (1822); Orr v. Hodgson, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453, 463 (1819); Craig v. Radford, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 594 (1818); Jackson ex dem. The
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b. The Spanish Treaty Cases
A second line of treaty cases almost wholly opposite the land ownership
cases (opposite in the sense that, rather than important but uninteresting they
are interesting but not nearly so important) also occupied the Court in this
period. The cases arose under a seemingly innocuous 1795 Treaty between the
United States and Spain that sought to partially displace the law of captures
between the two nations. Congress could hardly have imagined that so
elementary an aim could lead to so much litigation.
One set of cases arose from American privateering during the War of
1812 and begins in 1815 with The Nereide. The case called for the Court to
construe Article XV of the treaty with Spain, in which the nations stipulated to
each other that "free ships make free goods."432 That is, if enemy goods were
found on a Spanish ship, they would not be subject to capture. It was contended
to the Court that, by virtue of the fact that Spain and the United States had
modified the ordinary law of nations in this manner, they must have also meant
the negative: enemy ships make enemy goods.433 Chief Justice Marshall found
this position hard to take seriously.434 Justice Johnson was less generous,
calling it "wholly irreconcilable to any principle of logical deduction." 435
Interestingly, Chief Justice Marshall signaled openness to inspecting
"correspondence between the secretary of state of the United States and the
minister of the French republic in 1793" to see if American treaty negotiators at
the time of the Spanish treaty understood that the "character of the cargo should
be determined by the character of the flag," but "[n]ot being in possession of
this correspondence" he was unwilling to wait for the parties to produce it,
since he thought it would not resolve the interpretive question anyway.436 This
"openness" may have been nothing more than an excuse to lavish praise on
Washington's first cabinet. 437
Cases centering on this somewhat entertaining interpretive bauble ("free
People of the State of New York v. Clarke, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 1 (1818); Harden v. Fisher, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 300 (1816).
432. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 395 (1815); see Treaty of Friendship, Limits and
Navigation, Spain-U.S., Oct. 27, 1795, 2 U.S.T. 318.
433. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 395.
434. Id. at 421. ("Some stipulate that the character of the cargo shall depend upon the flag,
some that the neutral flag shall protect the goods of an enemy, some that the goods of a neutral in the
vessel of a friend shall be prize of war, and some that the goods of an enemy in a neutral bottom shall be
safe, and that friendly goods in the bottom of an enemy shall be safe.").
435. Id. at 431 (Johnson, J., concurring).
436. Id. at 421-22.
437. Id. After all, Marshall uses his quasi-invitation to introduce evidence of the intentions of
Washington's first cabinet as an opportunity to wax:
On the talents and virtues which adorned the cabinet of that day, on the patient fortitude
with which it resisted the intemperate violence with which it was assailed, on the
firmness with which it maintained those principles which its sense of duty prescribed, on
the wisdom of the rules it adopted, no panegyric has been pronounced at the bar in which
the best judgment of this Court does not concur.
Id. at 422. The implications of these statements are that Justice Marshall saw an opportunity to say that
the opinions of Washington's first cabinet, because it was Washington's first cabinet, might hold a
special pride of place for the Court even if otherwise the Court would not look to such evidence.
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ships make free goods") would, like the swallows to Capistrano, return to the
Court. The problem with the clause is that it is almost entirely impossible to
administer. The Spanish were trading freely with the British during the War of
1812, and by the treaty's terms, once merchandise made it onto a Spanish ship
it was "free." This created strange incentives, both for British merchants and
American privateers. So it was that the Court confronted The Pizarro in
1817.438 The Pizarro, laden with British goods, lacked passport documents-
the documents that under the Spanish treaty's seventeenth article were
presumptively sufficient to prove it was Spanish. 439 The captors thought that
since the ship lacked the right papers, by negative implication it was
presumptively captureable (and, therefore, salvageable) as a British prize.4
They further argued that the owners of the ship were not "subjects" of Spain
but merely merchants operating out of Spain and thus not within the Spanish
treaty." 1 Justice Story for a unanimous Court dismissed both contentions in
two paragraphs, using ordinary textualist approaches to statutory interpretation
442
calling the first baseless and the second "very clear[ly] . . . not the true
interpretation of the language."443
The 1795 Treaty with Spain was called to do service in settings its makers
could hardly have foreseen when civil war broke out between Spain and her
former colonies. "4 When, in the Court's words, "James Chaytor, styling
himself Don Diego Chaytor" captured the Spanish ships Santissima Trinidad
and St. Ander, their Spanish owners contended that "Don Diego" was
American, and thus even though he commanded the Independencia for the
United Provinces of Rio de la Plata-a military vessel" 5 in that nation's
valiant fight for independence against the Spanish-he was not entitled to the
ship because the 1795 Treaty prohibited Americans from capturing Spanish
vessels.446 Though counsel for Don Diego made valiant points about the policy
implications of allowing a treaty between Spain and the United States to bind
third parties like Rio de la Plata, Justice Story, writing for a unanimous Court,
held that the treaty's terms simply did not reach the case." 7 Article XIV
prohibited American privateering, not captures undertaken by military
commanders who happened also to be American citizens. Wrote Story, "[I]t is
not for this Court to make the construction of the treaty broader than the
apparent intent and purport of the language."4 And when Americans did
engage in privateering against the Spanish, the Court, true to its word, restored
438. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227 (1817).
439. Id. at 244.
440. Id. at 233-38.
441. Id. at 245.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 245-46.
444. The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52, 63-64 (1819).
445. In the language of admirality, a "public" vessel.
446. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 330 (1822).
447. Id. at 346-47.
448. Id. at 347.
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their captures to Spain.449
c. The Amiable Isabella
These Spanish treaty cases are important, however, if only because they
weave the intellectual fabric surrounding the most difficult and thus, for present
purposes, significant, treaty interpretation decision of the Marshall Court's
middle period: The Amiable Isabella.450 The Isabella was a merchant cargo
ship flying Spanish colors and bearing Spanish documents captured by the
cruiser Roger Quarles.451 The captors contended that the Isabella and her
cargo were really British and that the Isabella was disguised under Spanish
documents and bound for a British port.452 The Spanish claimants disagreed,
insisting ship and cargo were "bona fide Spanish."453 Moreover, unlike the
Pizarro, the Isabella carried a passport document of the kind that was meant to
signal she was presumptively Spanish under the 1795 Treaty.454 The case
would center on this document's legal sufficiency.
The captors' attorneys argued the document was either fraudulent,
improperly issued, or not the right document, and, most weightily, that the
treaty's provisions providing for the presumptive verity of such documents
455
were inoperative.
Putting aside all other questions, the Court held that the entire case hinged
on just one: whether the provision of the treaty that made passports
presumptive evidence of Spanish nationality was null and void because the
parties ultimately never affixed a model passport document to the treaty.456
Justice Story concluded, for six of the Court's seven justices-Chief Justice
Marshall, Washington, Livingston, Todd, Duvall and Story-"that the form of
the passport not having been annexed to the 17th article of the treaty, the
immunity, whatever it was, intended by that article, never took effect, and
therefore, in examining and deciding on the case before us, we must be
governed by the general law of prize." 4 Justice Johnson vigorously
dissented.458
As one can imagine, the stakes of depriving so significant a treaty
provision of legal effect-the lynchpin of an international regulatory scheme-
could not have been greater. The Court ordered the case reargued.459 Then the
449. The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 152, 171-72 (1821) (restoring property taken by
American privateers to Spanish owners); see also The La Nereyda, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 108, 172-74
(1823) (restoring the La Nereyda to Spain).
450. In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821).
451. Id. at 5, 66.
452. Id. at 66.
453. Id. at 67.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 67-68.
456. Id. at 68-69.
457. Id. at 76.
458. Id. at 81-97 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
459. Id. at 65-66.
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Executive intervened and the case was argued again.460
The intervention of the Executive is a matter of some importance to the
case proper. The Attorney General argued in favor of invalidating the treaty's
operative provisions. It is unclear precisely what motivated this. In his dissent,
Justice Johnson postulated Executive shortsightedness,4' or alternatively, and
more plausibly, that the United States had become a sufficient naval power that
the unilateral right to search Spanish ships was thought worth granting Spain
the reciprocal right to search American ships (and thus any excuse to nullify the
treaty was a good one).462
Some light can be shed on the position of the Executive by a
contemporaneous discussion of the case by the House Committee on the
Judiciary. In 1822, the claimants in the case petitioned the Committee to
indemnify them for the value of their soon-to-be-lost ship on the belief that the
Supreme Court was about to rule against them.463 The allegations of the
claimants are somewhat hysterical, "insinuat[ing] very strongly that the
Attorney General was not moved in this course by a sense of official duty, but
by the interest he felt in the case as counsel of the captors, with a large
contingent fee depending on the event.'"
Nonetheless, the allegations reveal that it was the Attorney General-
upon the orders of President Monroe-who pressed for the destruction of the
treaty's operative provisions. The Committee's conclusion that this was the
proper course and the right outcome sheds additional light on why the
Executive branch may have sought the treaty's invalidation:
If such a paper, however obtained, was to preclude all investigation, there was
all end, in time of war, to the right of capture, and the United States would have
been entirely stripped of the means of maritime warfare-an unarmed and
defenceless victim of any foe, however contemptible .... .6
The Executive's motives, whatever they were, are important to
understand insofar as the Attorney General largely withheld them from his
arguments in the case and instead molded his arguments around the treaty's
text. In the first argument before the Court, in tandem with private counsel for
the captors, seemingly every style of argument was brandished-that the
passport was fraudulent, improperly issued, and was not presented to the
captors in compliance with the treaty's terms thereby entitling a Prize Court to
adjudicate it. On the issue of sound policy, he argued that the treaty
460. Id.
461. Id. at 86-87.
462. Id. at 87.
463. CONG. GLOBE, 17th Cong., Ist Sess. 872 (1822) (entitled "Capture of the Ship Amiable
Isabella and Cargo: Communicated to the House of Representatives, May 4, 1822").
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 26-36 (transcribing the arguments of Mr.
Wheaton, for the captors and respondents, which included that the passport in the case had been
"fraudulently obtained and used" but even if it had not been, it was "not such as the treaty requires").
The Attorney General, William Wirt, amplified Mr. Wheaton's arguments in his first presentation of the
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provision was so poorly designed that it defeated the whole purpose of having
the treaty, and then invoked Vattel's interpretive rules in support of the
proposition that "[t]he spirit and intention of a treaty is always to be regarded in
its interpretation," citing "Vattel. Droit des Gens, 1. 2. c. 17. s. 268-270. 274-
282."" While probably a misleading citation to Vattel-whose very first
maxim is "if the text is clear, stop" -it is fascinating nonetheless that the
Attorney General thought the only manner by which he could sneak policy into
his arguments was with Vattel's imprimatur, however oblique.4 9 Indeed, at re-
argument, he limited his remarks purely to text and separation of powers issues:
"admitting that the Court can supply the form, how is it to be done?"470 He
asked-finding that such a judicial determination would be entirely policy-
driven and divorced from the text, he cautioned, "[t]he office of this Court is to
construe, not to make or amend treaties."471
If ever there were a case calling for a saving construction by the Court-
some means or method of interpretation that could give effect to the provision
at issue-The Amiable Isabella would seem to have been the case. Yet, the
Court held to textualism. Muscular textualism. Justice Story devoted much of
his nearly eight-page examination of Article XVII to the materials the Court
could not and would not look to in interpreting the provision at issue.472 Wrote
Story, Article XVII of the Treaty said that the form of the Passport will be
"annexed to this treaty."473 But "[iln point of fact, no form of a passport was
made out and annexed to the treaty." As such:
There is no room here left for interpretation, on account of ambiguous language
of the parties. They have expressed themselves in the clearest manner, and it is
to the passport, whose form is to be annexed to the treaty, and to none other,
that the effect intended by the treaty, whatever that may be, either as conclusive
case:
The Attorney-General, on the same side, insisted that the case was not within the
protection of the treaty, because the vessel was not documented according to its
provisions, and the only paper which could possibly answer to the description of the
sealetter or passport, required by the 17th article, was concealed, and not shown by the
master to the captors, as provided by the 18th, so that they had a right to detain and send
in the vessel for adjudication.
Id. at 36. The Attorney General continued: "the very terms of the document produced, which state it to
have been issued 'for want of royal passports' showed it was not a passport document, and further that,
the papers and depositions produced by the ship owners, "so far from satisfying the conscience of the
Court, increase the suspicions excited by the want of the documents required by the treaty, documents so
easily procured where the property is really Spanish, and the vessel fairly entitled to the privileges of a
Spanish ship, that it is incredible any such vessel should want them." Id. at 37-38. See generally id. at
36-41 (transcribing the arguments of the Attorney General in the case).
467. Id. at 38.
468. VATTEL, supra note 23, at 244-45.
469. The provisions cited in Vattel do not actually stand for the proposition that one should
look broadly to a statute's purpose. Section 282 of Vattel, for instance, counsels against interpretations
that lead to absurdities. Id. at 252. This is hardly a ringing endorsement of purposivism.
470. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 49.
471. Id. at 47.
472. Id. at 68-76.
473. Id. at 69.
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or primafacie evidence of proprietary interest, is attributed.474
Over the five pages that followed, Justice Story argued that separation of
powers meant the Supreme Court had only the power to "construe" not to
"make" treaties.475 He argued that the Court could not supply omitted terms
whether "small or great, important or trivial."476 He made reference to the idea
that the method of interpretation had independent valence in the Law of
Nations, writing,
We are to find out the intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation
applied to the subject matter; and having found that, our duty is to follow it as
far as it goes, and to stop where that stops-whatever may be the imperfections
or difficulties which it leaves behind.477
He argued that unlike "civil concerns of private persons" in which cy pres is
"just and appropriate," in the solemn compacts of nations so "far as judicial
tribunals are called upon to interpret or enforce them . . . [w]e can as little
dispense with forms as with substance."478 He argued that it was not even
entirely clear that the omission of the annexation was an error-it may very
well have been the result of a substantive issue with the execution of the
treaty.479 Perhaps the parties never came to agreement on the point, or could
not get the form of the passport ratified, or found that it would be impossible to
design a document that could not be counterfeited with unacceptable ease.480
Whatever the case, Story and the other Justices thought it beyond the Supreme
481Court's powers to supply so central an element to an international treaty.48
Not a word in Justice Story's opinion makes reference to whether the
holding of the Court will have good or bad consequences for the United
48248States. Not a word of reference is made to the intentions of the drafters,483
though it was placed in evidence and argued extensively what they "must have"
thought when they created the passport provision.484 The Court read the text,
and interpreted accordingly.
Indeed, this self-denying interpretive approach is cast in even starker
relief by the fireworks in Justice Johnson's dissent. 485 Justice Johnson
disagreed with the Court's entire interpretive framework, arguing that, in
interpreting a treaty, the Court should look to "history, analogy, and policy, as
474. Id. at 70.
475. Id. ("It would be to make, and not to construe a treaty.").
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 73.
479. Id. at 74.
480. Id. at 74-76.
481. Id. at 76.
482. See id. at 65-81.
483. See id.
484. See, e.g., id. at 63 (argument by Harper, counsel for the claimants, that so important a
change in the treaty would have been accompanied by a provision explicitly repealing the passport
provisions).




well as language. On this basis he would have repaired the operation of the
passport provisions via judicial surgery-essentially piecing together a form for
the passport document from descriptions of the document present in the rest of
the treaty.487 He thought the Executive's intervention in the case wholly
disingenuous, founded either on shortsighted policy considerations or raw
opportunism, both of which were unfit for judicial endorsement.488 He thought
it manifestly reasonable for the Court to take some liberty in repairing a treaty
that the nation had gone to such lengths to negotiate. He closed his dissent with
a rousing appeal to the purposes and intentions of the treaty negotiators,
writing: "No one who reads and compares these four articles, the 15th, 16th,
17th, and 18th, and considers the historical events in which they originated, can
for a moment suppose, that this was the object which led to the insertion of the
two latter of those articles."489 Justice Johnson, who was appointed by
President Jefferson in 1804 and served until 1834,490 was the Court's "first
great dissenter" for a reason491: his views were often out of step with those of
492the rest of the Marshall Court. The Amiable Isabella was no exception.
While the rest of the Justices on the Court saw the case as a difficult one,
ultimately bounded by unmistakable text, only Justice Johnson thought inquiry
into motives-those of the drafters of the treaty and the Attorney General at the
bar-should have had an impact on the outcome of the case.
The Amiable Isabella is truly an important case in the quest to discern the
original understanding of treaty interpretation because the differences between
the majority and dissent turn on the method of interpretation the Court
employs. It reveals in unmistakable terms that the interpretive methodology of
six Justices of the Supreme Court even thirty years after the ratification of the
Constitution remained a sophisticated textualism grounded in interpretive rules
like those of Vattel-rules that were cited to the Court by the prevailing side in
the very case.
d. Other Middle-Period Treaty Cases
The end of the Marshall Court's middle period witnessed something of a
renaissance of declarations of faith in textual interpretation. In addition to The
Amiable Isabella the Court would pledge its allegiance to treaty textualism in at
486. See id.; see also Michael S. Straubel, Textualism, Contextualism, and the Scientific Method
in Treaty Interpretation: How Do We Find the Shared Intent of the Parties?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1191,
1198-99 (1994) ("Quite clearly, Justice Johnson stated that a treaty should not be interpreted according
to common law rules used to interpret a criminal statute. Rather, the intent of the parties should be
drawn from 'history, analogy, and policy, as well as language."' (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S.
at 85 (Johnson, J., dissenting))).
487. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 89, 92 (Johnson, J. dissenting).
488. Id. at 86-92.
489. Id. at 96.
490. Mark R. Killenbeck, William Johnson, the Dog That Did Not Bark?, 62 VAND. L. REV.
407, 408 (2009).
491. Meredith Kolsky, Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court Dissent,
83 GEO. L.J. 2069, 2077 (1995).
492. Id. at 2095-97; Killenbeck, supra note 490, at 408 (calling him the Court's "first true
contrarian").
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least two other cases in the period: Green v. Biddle,493 and Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town ofNew Haven.494 Neither
case possessed the panache or the sophistication of The Amiable Isabella.
Nonetheless, each occasioned comments from the author of the majority
opinion on the importance of strict adherence to text.
In Green v. Biddle, an otherwise obscure 6-to-I decision interpreting the
impact on private property rights of the interstate compact between Kentucky
and Virginia that created Kentucky out of Virginia, Justice Washington
wrote:
[T]hat where the words of a law, treaty, or contract, have a plain and obvious
meaning, all construction, in hostility with such meaning, is excluded. This is a
maxim of law, and a dictate of common sense; for were a different rule to be
admitted, no man, however cautious and intelligent, could safely estimate the
extent of his engagements, or rest upon his own understanding of a law, until a
judicial construction of those instruments had been obtained.496
Justice Johnson dissented.497
Later that same term, Justice Washington would reaffirm the Court's
treaty textualism explicitly in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in
Foreign Parts v. Town of New Haven, another of the seemingly inexhaustible
land ownership cases.498 Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign
Parts dealt with whether foreign corporations were granted the ability to hold
and own land in Vermont under the 1783 Treaty of Peace, and if so, whether
that entitlement was again lost by virtue of the War of 1812.499 Writing for
what he termed a "majority of the Court"500 (though there were no published
dissents), Justice Washington wrote:
The terms in which this article [Article VI of the Treaty of Paris] is expressed
are general and unqualified, and we are aware of no rule of interpretation
applicable to treaties, or to private contracts, which would authorize the Court
to make exceptions by construction, where the parties to the contract have not
thought proper to make them. Where the language of the parties is clear of all
ambiguity, there is no room for construction.501
Notably, counsel for the defendants in the case thought that "[t]he British
treaties are to be construed, not only as to the sort of title meant to be protected,
493. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
494. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823). It is also worth noting that these cases are hardly cherry-
picked. The land ownership cases, Spanish Treaty cases, Biddle and Society for Propagation in Foreign
Parts comprise a large proportion of all the treaty cases decided in the Marshall Court's middle period.
495. Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 69-71 (1823) (describing the issues to be decided).
496. Id. at 89-90.
497. Id. at 94 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
498. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, 21 U.S. 464 (1823).
499. Id. at 479.
500. Id. at 495.
501. Id. at 490.
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but also the sort of persons and property meant to be protected"502 and thus
argued that the negotiators did not reasonably intend to include corporations
within the class of those protected by the treaty's terms. He cited Vattel for
support, arguing that Vattel holds that "[i]n the interpretation of treaties, the
probable intention of the Framers is to be taken as the guide, and the sense of
the terms they use is to be limited and restrained by the circumstances of the
case" citing "Vattel, Droit des Gens, 1. 2. c. 17. s. 270"o53 and quoting from the
French Edition of the treatise at length.5 " While not a precise characterization
of Vattel, even if it had been one, Justice Washington's response that "the
language of the parties is clear of all ambiguity" seems the appropriate
textualist rejoinder.5o This was especially so given Vattel's First Maxim that
"It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation."506
Ultimately, what these cases reveal is that as Chief Justice Marshall
entered his final years on the Court, and decided Foster v. Neilson507 and
United States v. Percheman,508 the intellectual foundations for his interpretive
approach were deeply rooted. Far from introducing a new notion into treaty
interpretation in Foster, Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of the treaty
arose directly from his understanding that treaties were to be interpreted
textually-as they had long been interpreted and as they were meant to be
interpreted.
iii. The Late Period: Foster v. Neilson and United States v.
Percheman
This last section focuses on the late Marshall Court, the period bookended
by Foster v. Neilson, on one end, and United States v. Percheman on the other.
Chief Justice Marshall passed away in 1835, only a few years after the decision
in Percheman.so9 At the time of his passing, the nation and the Court were in
the midst of a revolutionary transition as Jacksonian Justices replaced the old
Federalists and the Court's linkages to the Framers began to fray. 510
Nonetheless, Marshall's opinions in both Foster and Percheman adhere to the
old treaty textualism of the first Supreme Court, right down to extensive
citations to Vattel by the litigants, and deeply textual approaches by the Court.
502. Id. at 476-77.
503. Id. at 476 (1823). The relevant provision of Vattel cited says that "whenever we meet with
any obscurity in it [a written treaty], we are to consider what probably were the ideas of those who drew
up the deed, and to interpret it accordingly." VATTEL, supra note 23, at 247.
504. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 476.
505. Id. at 490.
506. VATTEL, supra note 23, at 244-45.
507. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
508. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
509. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lives of John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1402
(2002).
510. See id. at 1401-05 (explaining the revolution in American political thought that coincided
with Chief Justice Marshall's passing); Albert Broderick, From Constitutional Politics to Constitutional
Law: The Supreme Court's First Fifty Years, 65 N.C. L. REV. 945, 950-53 (1987) (creating a similar
account).
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a. Foster v. Neilson
The Court in Foster v. Neilson confronted a seemingly modest problem:
deciding who between the plaintiffs and defendants had a better claim to
ownership over certain land in Florida.511 But the claim depended on when the
land passed from the sovereignty of Spain to the United States,5 12 and because
the territory was disputed for almost two decades, the Court was forced to
construe multiple contradictory statutes and treaties passed and entered into by
Spain and the United States-with each nation acting as if it had sovereignty
over some amorphous portion of the territory for some indistinct period.513 As
Chief Justice Marshall wrote when he began wading into the interpretive
morass these mutually conflicting laws and treaties fashioned, "[t]he Court will
not attempt to conceal the difficulty which is created by these articles."514
But rather than shy away from textualism and the difficulty it entails,
Marshall engaged in article-by-article, clause-by-clause analysis of each of the
treaties in issue,515 performing, in essence, a search for chain of sovereignty
over the territory from 1756 onward.
Other issues aside, the crucial difficulty lay in the fact that as of 1803 the
United States began to act as if all of the territory in Florida belonged to the
United States,51 7 but in entering into a treaty with Spain in 1819 to end a long-
simmering territorial conflict and resolve all claims, the 1819 treaty included
language that indicated not all of the land in question belonged to the United
States or to Spain.s51 Because it neither acknowledged that the land was wholly
Spain's or wholly the United States' but rather acquiesced and acknowledged
that some indiscernible portion had in 1819 belonged to one, while some had
belonged to the other, the case was almost irresolvable.
Chief Justice Marshall lamented that the case would be easy if the treaty
simply ceded all of Spain's "territory" to the United States without
qualification.519 But, Marshall lamented, the insertion of words qualifying the
grant could not "be rejected as surplusage. They have a plain meaning, and that
meaning can be no other than to limit the extent of the cession. We cannot say
they were inserted carelessly or unadvisedly, and must understand them
according to their obvious import."520 While he acknowledged that it was "not
improbable" that the "terms were selected which might not compromise the
dignity of either government" it nonetheless rendered the treaty almost wholly
nonjusticiable for want of criteria by which to determine which lands were
511. Foster, 27 U.S. 253, at 299-301
512. Id. at 253-56.
513. Id.at310-11.
514. Id. at 310.
515. Id. at 300-01.
516. Id. at 300.
517. Id. at 305-07.
518. Id. at 310-11.




under the sovereign control of which nation at any point in time.521
Chief Justice Marshall nevertheless soldiered on, casting about for some
evidence of which lands were meant by the 1819 treaty still to belong to
Spain.522 Marshall explained the divided conclusions the Court drew implicitly
from other provisions in the treaty before revealing that, thankfully, one the
provisions in the 1819 treaty cut the Gordian Knot because it reserved to
Congress the decision of who owned the Florida land.523 Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, thus found that the eighth article of the treaty did not
anticipate judicial determinations, but rather delegated the decision to Congress
to resolve.524 As Marshall noted, "when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the
treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the
Court.,525 As such, since the treaty's eighth article did not proclaim that grants
given to Spanish landowners in the territories to be ceded would be confirmed
as valid in the United States, but rather said that the land grants "shall be
ratified and confirmed" it indicated an anticipation that Congress would do the
ratifying and confirming.526
It would be fair to say this is a fine distinction that the text hardly bears,
but it is worth pausing to note that textualism is not literalism. Given the
manifest difficulty-if not impossibility-of discerning which lands were
actually ceded by Spain according to suitable judicially administrable criteria,
the inference that the treaty anticipated future legislative action was
significantly bolstered. As Marshall wrote, "[t]he judiciary is not that
department of the government, to which the assertion of its interests against
foreign powers is confided" 27 and later, in the opinion reiterated that "[a]
question like this respecting the boundaries of nations, is, as has been truly said,
more a political than a legal question."528 Given the difficulty of a judicial
construction of the treaties at issue, and given that the language was susceptible
to the interpretation the Court put upon it, Justice Marshall's textual opinion
could be thought the fullest expression of a mature textualism sensitive to the
interpretive gravity of the Constitution's separation of powers framework.
Even so, there was an alternative, and powerful, counterargument pressed
in the case by Daniel Webster, one the Court passed over largely in silence.
Representing the landowners whose titles were traceable to Spain only if the
lands in question did not pass to the United States until 1819 (rather than in
1803), Webster sought to invoke Vattel to the Court for the proposition that
since the 1803 treaty's language was precise and clear, unmistakably designed
521. Id. at 311.
522. Id. at 313.
523. Id. at 314.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Foster, 27 U.S. 253, 314-15 (1829).
527. Id. at 307.
528. Id. at 309.
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to protect the property rights of those with Spanish titles still residing in
Spanish Florida, the Court should have given it maximal effect, while heavily
discounting the vague imprecise language in the 1819 treaty. 529 This argument
derived from Vattel's Second Maxim, which counsels interpreting ambiguity
against the party that benefits from the ambiguity.530
The Court in Foster, however, saw interpreting the treaty as non-self-
executing the more reasonable understanding of the text, a tenuous construction
that the Court would revisit four years later in United States v. Percheman.
b. United States v. Percheman
United States v. Percheman famously overturned the Court's holding in
Foster v. Neilson by interpreting the 1819 land cessation treaty at issue in
Foster to call for a judicial determination of the validity of the claimant's title
531in the case. The formal difference between Percheman and Foster is that a
new English translation of the treaty came to light in Percheman that changed
the fair import of the words of the provision construed in Foster.532 A more
nuanced understanding of Percheman would probably be that Percheman gave
the Court an opportunity to revise the weaknesses in the textualism in Foster
and place the judicial construction of the treaty on stronger textual footing.
Attorney General Roger Taney, the man who would be the next Chief
Justice,533 pressed the case on behalf of the United States, arguing that Foster
was properly decided and the Court should dismiss the claim.5 34 But this time,
unlike Daniel Webster, whose citation in Foster was just a toss off to "Vattell,
Book II. Ch. XVII. upon the interpretation of treaties,"5 35 the counsel for
Percheman came to the Court prepared to launch an all-out assault on the
Court's weak textualism in Foster. White, the attorney for Percheman, began
by proposing that the purpose for which the 1803 treaty was entered was
precisely to protect the property rights of Spanish landowners, and thus,
according to Vattel and other "most esteemed publicists," this counseled, to the
degree it was ambiguous, giving a reading favorable to the Spanish title holder
in the subsequent 1819 treaty.536 White thus began: "Before proceeding to
examine the language of the treaty, a few observations on the rules of
interpretation may, perhaps, be pardoned."5 37 He then proceeded to discuss
529. Id. at 295 (argument of Daniel Webster, counsel for the plaintiffs).
530. VATTEL, supra note 23, at 245 ("If he who could and ought to have explained himself, has
not done it, it is to his own detriment.").
531. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
532. This was, for instance, Chief Justice Roberts's understanding of the case in Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514 (2008).
533. See John J. Gibbons, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 222, 223 (1975) (reviewing CARL
B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME v: THE TANEY
PERIOD, 1836-64 (1974)).
534. See Percheman, 32 U.S. at 59-60, 82 (describing the argumentt of Attorney General
Taney).
535. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, at 295 (describing the arguments of Daniel Webster).




Vattel and Grotius at length. 3  His next move was to confront directly the
Court's reading of the ambiguous text in Foster, arguing that it contradicted
these rules. 539 He then threw the Court a lifeline: an opportunity to easily
distinguish Foster. He did this by arguing that a recent translation of the
Spanish Treaty showed that the language was not the same in the Spanish and
English copies: "The English side of the treaty leaves the ratification of the
grants executory-they shall be ratified; the Spanish, executed-they shall
continue acknowledged and confirmed, quedaran artificados."540
Chief Justice Marshall, again writing for the Court, took hold of the
opportunity Percheman's counsel offered and distinguished Foster while
moving onto solidly textualist ground. Wrote Marshall, "[h]ad this
circumstance been known [that the text of the Spanish treaty was self-
executory], we believe it would have produced the construction which we now
give to the article."541 With the presumption flipped, the Court held that the
treaty was susceptible to direct judicial enforcement, and affirmed the decision
below allowing Percheman to go forward in his lawsuit.542
E. Treaty Textualism as Intepretive Consensus
What this history shows is that the judicial practices of the Supreme
Court's first decade and through the end of Marshall's more than thirty years as
Chief Justice, bore an astonishing characteristic-interpretive consensus. It was
a consensus traceable to the way lawyers were socialized into the legal
profession. It was a consensus that also informed the design, drafting, and
ratification of the United States Constitution. And it was not a naive method-
those who expounded it understood its limitations. Rather, treaty textualism
was followed because among all of the available modes of interpretation, it was
considered the least likely to lead to error and mischief. Grounded in Grotius'
1625 work, as enhanced and expounded by Vattel, Burlamaqui, Pufendorf,
Rutherforth, Blackstone, and others, treaty textualism was the end product of a
nearly two-century conversation about the best way to interpret and enforce
promises between nations. And as the preceding cases reveal, it worked, even
when the Supreme Court confronted knotty and difficult interpretive questions.
IV. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Four views might be advanced concerning the constitutional status of the
original understanding of treaty interpretation. Two possible understandings of
the Constitution's design might indicate that judges construing treaties cannot
"derogate" from treaty textualism. Two others might indicate that treaty
538. Id. (invoking VATrEL, supra note 23, at 245, 247; GROTIUS, supra note 20, at 848.
539. Id. at 69-70 (invoking VATEEL, supra note 23 at 252, 265, as inconsistent with the Court's
holding in Foster).
540. Id. at 69.
541. Id. at 89.
542. Id. at 91-94 (construing the effect of statutes passed subsequent to the 1819 treaty on
Perchernan's rights).
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textualism is or was merely a "default rule" that is not constitutionally required.
First, it might be contended that because the prevailing understanding of
treaty interpretation was textual interpretation, the Constitution's advice and
consent procedures were designed with an expectation of treaty textualism in
mind. Derogating from treaty textualism almost assuredly aggrandizes the
Executive Branch at the expense of the Senate, since the Senate has little or no
ability to alter the strategies of the President's negotiators. Chief Justice
Roberts seemed to put forward such a view in Medellin, writing, "we do think it
rather important to look to the treaty language . . . [t]hat is after all what the
Senate looks to in deciding whether to approve the treaty." 43 These kinds of
separation of powers arguments largely mirror arguments over the
constitutionality of looking to legislative history, though in reverse. Since the
President cannot veto legislative history, which he may not even know about,
the constitutional balance is disturbed when Courts lend it interpretive
weight. 5" In the same way, when Courts construe treaties based on practice,
executive interpretation, or negotiating history, they construe them according to
criteria that the Senate had very little opportunity to take into account and
control. These arguments might possess special gravity in the treaty context
insofar as all of the evidence-from the framing convention to the ratification
to the early practice of the federal courts-indicates a strong, settled consensus
as to treaty interpretation. On this view, textual treaty interpretation was so
woven into the fabric of the document that it cannot be extricated from the very
essence of the Constitution itself.545
A second view, fully consistent with the first, would hold that treaties are
special and that the Constitution treats them as such by the very act of terming
them "treaties" in the Supremacy Clause and in Article III. Textual analysis of
the Constitution seems to suggest that treaties were not just understood to be
different from ordinary laws, but to be different from "Compacts and
Agreements," which were international combinations which States could enter
even though they could not enter into treaties proper.546 That treaties are
special was noted explicitly in early Supreme Court decisions, such as Gibbons
v. Ogden, where the Court held that treaties differed from compacts and
agreements by virtue of their weightiness, their duration, their tendency to
involve multiple interlocking instruments, and their ability to bind the whole
nation.547
But even if one concedes that treaties are not merely "laws," and not
543. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514 (2008).
544. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
673, 698-99 (1997).
545. Given that The Federalist Papers represented that the federal courts would render certain
interpretive outcomes, to the degree that other interpretive methods are adopted that deviate from those
views, it might be thought that those interpretive methods deviate from the original understanding of
how treaties would be interpreted. Federalist No. 78, for example, represents that judges shall be "bound
down by strict rules and precedents." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).




merely "Compacts and Agreements," this still leaves open whether they were
meant to be treated differently from an interpretive perspective. Here there is in
fact strong, credible evidence that treaty interpretation was thought to be a
distinctive concern and a substantive point of contention in the framing and
ratification of the Constitution. As Part II.C. explains in detail, the central
preoccupations in making treaties supreme law enforceable by federal (rather
than merely state) judges was to create international trust.548 Yet all of the
concerns that animated the creation of a life-tenured federal judiciary-the
threat of state provincialism, the need for stability, the need for judicial
integrity and the need for legal expertise-were ultimately just means of
ensuring an outcome, namely, that the methods of interpretation actually
employed would be acceptable to European counterparties and would thereby
convince them to enter into treaties with the United States 549
Some judicial comments on treaty interpretation in the early republic
seem to confirm the view that treaty interpretation was special. In Chisholm v.
Georgia, Justice Iredell wrote that, in interpreting the Constitution's text, "No
part of the Law of Nations can apply to this case, as I apprehend, but that part
which is termed 'The Conventional Law of Nations'; nor can this any otherwise
apply than as furnishing rules of interpretation.,"s In The Pizarro, some
decades later, Justice Story commented that "the language of the law of nations
. . . is always to be consulted in the interpretation of treaties.,ss In The
Amiable Isabella he would further hint that the Court was bound to apply "just
rules of interpretation," and seemed to suggest these rules were derived from
the law of nations.552 And in case after case between 1780 and 1835, the
interpretive rules set out by the treatises on the law of nations were cited
alongside and, indeed, without distinction from, substantive precepts of the law
of nations itself.
The foregoing are all powerful evidence that treaties had a special
character in the minds of the Constitution's Framers and ratifiers, and that they
believed that treaties were meant to be interpreted in a certain way by virtue of
the very use of the word "treaties" in the Supremacy Clause. If this is so, then
treaty textualism may very well be embedded in the Constitution itself.
On the other hand, two arguments might be made that imply that the
methodology of treaty interpretation was open to change in the minds of the
Constitution's Framers and ratifiers.
First, one might imagine that the use of the word "treaties" in the
Supremacy Clause, even if it was designed to incorporate customary
international law understandings of treaty interpretation, was meant to
incorporate contemporary customary international law at whatever point in
time a treaty was signed and ratified. On this view, the word "treaties" in the
548. See supra Section II.C.
549. See id.
550. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449 (1793).
551. The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 246 (1817).
552. In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821).
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Supremacy Clause changes when the times change, much like one might argue
that "cruel and unusual" in the Eighth Amendment changes with changing
social norms and understandings. On this view, the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which has been recognized by some courts to embody the
customary international law of treaty interpretation,ss3 is entirely sufficient to
displace treaty textualism and may in fact already have.
Second, one might posit that the interpretation of treaties is merely a
constitutional default rule that was meant to fall within the powers of the
representative branches to change. On this view, it may be possible that
Congress could enact rules of treaty interpretation under the Necessary and
Proper Clause as a way of construing and constraining the judicial power.
Alternately, the Senate and President may be able to modify the rules of treaty
interpretation by treaty even if customary international law cannot change the
method used in American courts. Since all would acknowledge that a treaty can
prescribe the rules for its own interpretation (by setting out a definitions
section, for instance) it may be possible to contend, by analogy, that the United
States could enter into a general international arrangement modifying the
method of treaty interpretation applicable to all treaties.
The choice among these four approaches depends on one's view of the
relative importance of the semantic and institutional choices made by the
Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has interpreted
treaties for nearly a century using a total evidence approach without significant
controversy or incident, while the early Supreme Court employed treaty
textualism for at least forty years with similar success. On purely pragmatic
grounds, all things being equal, one might imagine that textualism's other
virtues-its disciplining, channeling, and constraining features-would make it
the superior approach.554 On the other hand, the House of Lords ultimately
abandoned its strict fidelity to treaty textualism because interpreting treaties in
a manner inconsistent with other nations was more likely to lead to
international conflict, perhaps showing that pragmatic considerations point the
other way.5
Regardless of one's ultimate views on the issues involved, one could
certainly make a very powerful case that the Constitution's Framers and
ratifiers placed such outsized importance on the use of textual treaty
interpretation that it is a substantive constitutional commitment built into the
separation of powers and the Supremacy Clause, and is therefore
553. See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1351 (2008); Telman, supra note 14, at 417-18
(describing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the degree to which it has been
recognized as embodying principles of customary international law, both internationally and in United
States courts). But see Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty
Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 474-75 (2004) (raising independent concerns about the Vienna
Convention's ability to bind American judges).
554. For powerful arguments that textualism is the best approach to judicial interpretation on
institutional and pragmatic grounds, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006).





This Article has had both a narrow and a broad aim. Its narrow aim has
been to reveal that treaty textualism was originally understood as the
Constitution's prescribed method of treaty interpretation and it has sought to
show that the Constitution's Framers and ratifiers fought to ensure that treaties
would be interpreted textually. The practice of the Supreme Court in the fifty
years following the Revolutionary War was muscular textualism employed
even in hard cases when other approaches might have tempted the Court to
abandon this textual commitment. Also in a narrow vein, this Article bears
importantly on questions in the long simmering debate over treaty self-
execution. What the materials seem to reveal is that treaties were not meant to
be presumptively self-executing or non-self-executing-they were simply
meant to be interpreted textually. Since the text of most treaties at the time
clearly provided that they would bind the States automatically, the distinction
was seldom a significant one in the early republic.
More broadly, this Article also contributes to a nascent literature
dedicated to illuminating the interrelationship between the Framers'
interpretive expectations and their decisions about substantive institutional
commitments: the distribution of power and decisional authority between the
branches of the federal government, and between the federal government and
the states. The Framers' expectation that federal judges, especially those on the
Supreme Court, would remain committed textualists motivated their unusual
decision to withdraw supreme interpretive authority regarding critical
international agreements from the executive and legislative branches and vest
them in the judiciary.
In revealing the crucial interplay between substantive constitutional
structures and expected and actual interpretive practices, this Article invites
consideration of whether sudden shifts in interpretive commitments-even if
they do reflect a return to original meanings-are necessarily appropriate.
Interpretive practices have a kind of precedential value in themselves.
Interpretive practices are substantive. The very fact that the Framers allocated
powers among the branches of the government because they expected judges
would be textualists-rather than purposivists or pragmatists-reveals this. As
such, altering interpretive commitments and practices has ripple effects beyond
individual cases. Interpretive commitments necessarily shape separation of
powers and federalism. On this measure, the doctrines that govern separation of
powers and federalism and the expectations of individuals in the other branches
and in the states, have evolved for more than a century alongside a variant of
pragmatic treaty interpretation in the judiciary. As such, even an interpreter
committed to a strong form of originalism may need, nonetheless, to respect
these interpretive practices.
This shift is in some ways unfortunate because textualism may be the
primary justification for investing treaty interpretation in the judiciary.
Pragmatic, all-things-considered treaty interpretation is almost
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indistinguishable from the kind of interpretation likely to be performed by the
executive branch. Madison drew this conclusion at the Philadelphia
convention.556 And, indeed, in Medellin, it was the dissenters, led by Justice
Breyer, who voted to endorse the executive's interpretation of the treaty at
issue; it was the court's textualists, reading the treaty textually, who applied the
brakes. Moreover, the primary rationales for textualism have not waned since
the Constitution's adoption. The United States' interests in interpretive
stability, certainty, and international trust are no less salient now than they were
in 1787. And textualism, as this Article has shown, has a remarkable, nearly
four-hundred year old pedigree dating back to the writings of Hugo Grotius.
Ultimately, "treaty textualism" is about much more than a method of
interpretation; it is also about the Constitution's institutional arrangements,
which were structured to ensure that the United States' international promises
would be credible ones. Interpretation was and is an important piece of that
arrangement. This Article concludes that treaty textualism was the consensus
interpretive approach among those who designed, ratified, and first
implemented the Constitution. As such, it was a critical element of the
Constitution's structure at the founding and after.
556. 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 192, at 34 (July 17, 1787).
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